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WHAT Is CAESAR'S, WHAT Is

Goo's:

FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY FOR CHURCHES
LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER* & ZACHARY B. POHLMAN**
ABSTRACT

Bob Jones University v. United States is a highly debated Supreme
Court decision, both regarding whether it was correct and what exactly it
stands for, and a rarely applied one. Its recognition of a ''fundamental public policy doctrine" that could cause an otherwise tax-exempt organization
to lose its favorable federal tax status remains highly controversial, although the Court has shown no inclination to revisit the case, and Congress
has shown no desire to change the underlying statutes to alter the case's
result. That lack of action may be in part because the IRS applies the decision in relatively rare and narrow circumstances.
The mention of the decision during oral argument in Obergefell v.
Hodges raised the specter of more vigorous and broader application of the
doctrine, however. It renewed debate about what public policies other than
avoiding racial discrimination in education might qualify as fundamental
and also whether and to what extent the doctrine should apply to churches,
as opposed to the religious schools involved in the original case. The IRS
has taken the position that churches are no different than any other taxexempt organizations in this context, although it has only denied or revoked the tax-exempt status of a handful of churches based on this doctrine.
* Professor, Notre Dame Law School.
** J.D. candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2021. The authors are very grateful for
helpful comments on earlier drafts from Stephanie Barclay, Boyd Black, Mark E.
Chopko, Richard W. Garnett, and participants in the NYU School of Law National Center on Philanthropy and the Law Annual Conference and the Notre Dame Faculty Colloquium. Copyright© 2021 by Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer and Zachary B. Pohlman.
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The emergence of the Bob Jones University decision in the Obergefell
oral argument renders consideration of these issues particularly timely,
especially in light of developments over the past several decades both with
respect to the legal status of churches and what arguably could be considered fundamental policy. This Article therefore explores whether there are
emerging conflicts between a significant number of churches and what
could be considered fundamental public policy, not only with respect to
sexual orientation discrimination but also with respect to sex discrimination, sanctuary churches, and other areas. Finding that there are several
current or likely future such conflicts, it then explores whether there are
philosophical and legal grounds for treating churches differently from
other tax-exempt organizations for purposes of applying the contrary-tofundamental-public-policy doctrine and the related illegality doctrine.
Drawing on both the longstanding concept of "sphere sovereignty" and
emerging work in the area of First Amendment institutions, the Article
concludes that churches should not be subject to the former doctrine, but
that they still should be subject to loss of their tax benefits if they engage
in or encourage significant criminal activity. The Article then concludes
by applying this conclusion to the identified areas of current or likely future conflict to demonstrate how the IRS and the courts should apply the
Bob Jones University decision to churches.
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INTRODUCTION

"Tell us then, what is your opinion? Is it right to pay the
imperial tax to Caesar or not?" But Jesus, knowing their
evil intent, said, "You hypocrites, why are you trying to
trap me? Show me the coin used for paying the tax." They
brought him a denarius, and he asked them, "Whose
image is this? And whose inscription?" "Caesar's," they
replied. Then he said to them, "So give back to Caesar
what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's." 1

The relationship of churches and governments has a long and
fraught history, including with respect to taxes. 2 Policymakers,
church leaders, and various commentators have put forward numerous reasons both for and against preferential tax treatment for
some or all churches. 3 And when governments provide such preferential tax treatment, as they often do, the issue then arises of
what-if any-conditions can and should apply to such treatment.
More than thirty-five years ago the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Bob Jones University v. United States4 sent shock
waves through religious congregations even though the case itself
involved religious schools and not churches. 5 This was because the
case suggested that any organization, even a church, that was ex-:
empt from federal income tax as a "charity" and so also eligible to
receive tax deductible charitable contributions, could lose those
benefits if found to have an activity or purpose that was illegal or
otherwise "contrary to a fundamental public policy." 6 The vagueness of the latter phrase, combined with the specter of the Internal

l. Matthew 22:17-21 (New International Version).
2. For purposes of this Article, "churches" refers to house of worship of all types,
including synagogues, mosques, and temples. For a discussion of more specific legal
definitions, see infra Part IV.D.
3. See infra Parts III.B. and III.C.
4. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
5. Id. at 574.
6. Id. at 591-92.
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Revenue Service making determinations regarding what constitutes fundamental public policy, only heightened the fear that the
case could usher in new and intrusive IRS supervision of churches.7
However, reality did not come to reflect this fear. The IRS has
sought to strip tax benefits from churches based on Bob Jones University or the doctrine that it established only five times: once related to one of the parties in Bob Jones University, three times for
churches involved in illegal criminal activity, and once for an unapologetically racist church where the exact reasons for the revocation are unclear. 8 Indeed, the IRS has shown little interest in expanding the application of this case beyond situations involving
either racial discrimination or significant illegal activity. 9
Bob Jones University nevertheless remains good law, and the following exchange during oral argument in the Obergefell v. Hodges 10
same-sex marriage case reawakened the concerns of many religious
organizations and leaders:
JUSTICE AUTO: Well, in the Bob Jones case, the Court held
that a college was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it opposed interracial marriage or interracial dating. So would
the same apply to a university or a college if it opposed
same-sex marriage?
[SOLICITOR] GENERAL VERRILLI: You know, I-I don't
think I can answer that question without knowing more
specifics, but it's certainly going to be an issue. I-I don't
deny that. I don't deny that, Justice Alito. It is-it is going
to be an issue.11
7. See, e.g., William A. Drennan, Bob Jones University v. United States: For Whom Will
the Bell Toll?, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 588-93 (1985); Joe W. Miller, Note, Applying a
Public Benefit Requirement to Tax-Exempt Organizations, 49 Mo. L. REV. 353, 366, 368
(1984).
8. See infra Part LB.
9. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
10. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No.
14-556).
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This point was not lost on the dissenters in that case, who highlighted this possibility. 12 And it does not take much imagination to
apply Solicitor General Verrilli's response to churches, many of
which have strong positions opposing same-sex marriage. 13
So to what extent does Bob Jones University, combined with changing views of what constitutes fundamental public policy, actually
threaten the tax benefits enjoyed by churches? Part I of this Article
considers what the Court actually decided in that case, including
its (very limited) discussion of how its decision might apply to
churches. Part I also reviews the few subsequent applications of
that decision to churches by the IRS and the courts. Part II then
identifies several existing and likely future conflicts between
churches and fundamental public policy that the IRS and courts
have yet to address. The remainder of this Article then explores
how the IRS and courts should resolve these new conflicts. Part III
begins this exploration by considering the extent to which churches
enjoy preferential tax treatment in the United States, the reasons for
such treatment, and the constitutional ramifications of that treatment, all of which could affect the application of Bob Jones University to churches. Part IV then explores the philosophical and legal
basis for treating churches differently for tax purposes generally
and with respect to application of Bob Jones University specifically.
Finally, Part V pulls these strands together to provide a more complete answer to how Bob Jones University should apply to churches.
While many other scholars have addressed the issues covered in
the first four Parts, none have pulled together all of these various
lines of thought to comprehensively consider how Bob Jones University should apply to churches in the twenty-first century.

12. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 711 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Laurie Goodstein &
Adam Liptak, Schools Fear Gay Marriage Ruling Could End Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2015, at Al3.
13. See, e.g., Benjy Sarlin, O'Rourke says churches against gay marriage should lose tax
benefits, draws backlash, NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/o-rourke-says-churches-against-gay-marriage-should-lose-taxn1065186 [https://perma.cc/U9PX-JF22].
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Our conclusion is that churches should be at risk of losing their
federal tax benefits only if they engage in significant criminal activities and not if their activities or purposes are only contrary to fundamental public policy. The reason for this limitation on the application of Bob Jones University is that the tax benefits for churches are
based not only on a quid pro quo theory-that the societal benefits
they provide are sufficient to justify those tax benefits-but also on
a "soft sovereignty" theory that grants them significant autonomy
from the government, including with respect to taxes, in recognition of their distinct role in society. The legal bases for this soft sovereignty approach are the First Amendment's Religion Clauses and
the need for governments generally to avoid both substantially burdening religious exercise and undue entanglement with religious
institutions. However, given both the continued viability of Bob
Jones University and other considerations discussed below, this limited application applies only to churches and not to other religious
organizations, such as the religious schools in the Bob Jones University case. And since churches are not co-equal sovereigns with the
government and so are not above the law, in the rare instances
where it is conclusively shown that a church is engaging in substantial criminal activities that demonstrate a significant criminal purpose, the church should lose the tax benefits it otherwise would enjoy. In other words, this approach provides a demarcation between
what in this context belongs to Caesar and what does not that appropriately balances the legal rights of churches with the legal authority of the state.

I.

CHURCHES AND BOB JONES UNIVERSITY

Numerous commentators have described and analyzed the background, reasoning, and aftermath of Bob Jones University in great
detail.1 4 The purpose of this Article is not to cover that well-trodden

14. See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L.
REV. 397 (2005); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy:
Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1983); Miriam Galston, Pub-
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ground in detail or the many critiques of the Court's reasoning. Rather, for purposes of this Article we will accept the case as binding-a realistic assumption, given that the Supreme Court has
shown no inclination to revisit it and Congress has shown no interest in revising the applicable statutes to modify or overrule it. We
will instead focus on the points most salient to the case's potential
application to churches, including the few actual such applications
by the IRS and the courts in the wake of that decision. One important ramification of this assumption relates to the case's application to organizations that are religious in the sense that their missions flow from sincerely held religious beliefs but are not generally
considered churches, including the schools involved in the case.
Since the Court squarely rejected a First Amendment free exercise
of religion argument that such organizations should not be subject
to the fundamental public policy doctrine as applied in the case, 15
we will only briefly revisit that issue here, even though our analysis
arguably could extend to such organizations. 16 The focus of this Article is therefore to address an issue explicitly left open by the Court
in Bob Jones University-to what extent the Court's holding should
apply to churches.17

lie Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 VA.TAX REV. 291 (1984); Michael Hatfield et al., Bob Jones University: Defining Violations of Fundamental Public Policy (Nat'l
Ctr.
Philanthropy
&
L.,
Topics
in
Philanthropy
no.
6,
2000),
https://ncpl.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Monograph/Monograph2000BobJones.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLQ4-B8QL]; David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Let
Prophets Be (Non)Profits, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2017); Olatunde C. Johnson, The
Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion, and Congress' Extraordinary
Acquiescence, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES (William N. Eskridge et al. eds.,
2011); see also Drennan, supra note 7, at 565 n.21 (collecting academic articles written
about the case as it made its way to the Supreme Court).
15. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
16. See id. at 604-05; infra notes 345-349 and accompanying text. For an argument that
religious freedom protections should extend to religious entities that provide services
to the broader public, such as schools, see generally Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated
Religious Activity: A Case for Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1341 (2016).
17. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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The Case

Bob Jones University involved two nonprofit, religious, private
schools with racially discriminatory policies that they based on religious doctrine. 18 From 1975 through at least the time of the decision in 1983, Bob Jones University permitted African-Americans to
enroll but had a disciplinary rule prohibiting interracial dating, interracial marriage, and advocacy of such; the University also did
not admit applicants who were in an interracial marriage or were
known to engage in such advocacy. 19 Goldsboro Christian Schools,
a K-12 institution, generally accepted only whites as students, although it had on occasion accepted children from racially mixed
marriages in which one of the parents was white. 20
The statutory provisions at issue were the Internal Revenue Code
sections that usually provide nonprofit schools with tax exemption
and the ability to receive tax deductible contributions. 21 For purposes of this Article, the key legal question before the Court was
whether Congress intended to include in those provisions a requirement that in order to receive these benefits, an organization
had to satisfy a common-law standard the Court found applicable
to charitable trusts: that they "must serve a public purpose and not
be contrary to established public policy." 22 The Court generally answered this question in the affirmative, 23 but left significant uncertainty regarding the exact parameters of this doctrine in at least four
respects.
First, the Court subtly shifted its language from "established"
public policy to "fundamental" public policy, without explaining
the significance of this change. 24 Second, it left unclear whether an
18. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577.
19. Id. at 580--81.
20. Id. at 583.
21. I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (c)(2), 501(c)(3) (2018).
22. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586.
23. Id. at 592.
24. Compare id. at 586, 591 with id. at 592-93, 595, 596 n.21.
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organization disqualified itself from these tax benefits by acting
contrary to such a public policy, having a purpose contrary to such
public policy, or some combination of the two. 25 The Court also left
unclear what level of activity or priority of purpose would be required to result in disqualification. 26 Third, it stated that such disqualification flowed both from illegality and from being contrary
to such public policy, without explaining the difference between
the two. 27 Finally, it concluded that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause did not prevent disqualification because the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
was compelling and disqualification was the least restrictive means
to further that interest. 28 However, the Court did not reach whether
this holding extended to churches:
We deal here only with religious schools-not with
churches or other purely religious institutions; here, the
governmental interest is in denying public support to
racial discrimination in education. As noted earlier,
racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a pervasive
influence on the entire educational process," outweighing
any public benefit that they might otherwise provide. 29

It therefore left the application of its decision to churches uncertain.

25. See id. at 586-87.
26. Compare id. at 587 & n.11 (charitable "purposes"), 589 (public "purposes"), 591 &
n.18 ("purpose"), 592 & n.19 ("purpose"), with id. at 592 ("activity"), 593 n.20 ("activities"), 596 n.21 ("activities"), 598 ("activities").
27. See id. at 591.
28. See id. at 604. Despite the Court's use of compelling governmental interest and
least restrictive means language characteristic of strict scrutiny analysis, the Court appears to have in fact applied a more deferential level of scrutiny, possibly because of
the decision's tax context. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits,
Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2009); Elliot
M. Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury after Taxation with Representation of
Washington, Mueller and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275, 305 (1984).
29. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.29 (emphasis in original) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,469 (1973)).
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Many scholars have addressed these areas of uncertainty in detail. 30 Here it is sufficient to note that in the first three areas commentators have taken a broad range of positions, and neither the
Supreme Court nor the lower courts have done much to provide
clarity. 31 Similarly, the IRS has not done much to develop the concept of "fundamental" public policy. 32 In fact, its subsequent applications of Bob Jones University have been almost entirely limited to
situations involving criminal activities, racial discrimination relating to education, or, less commonly, to other contexts where such
discrimination "can reasonably be expected to aggravate the disparity in the educational, economic, or social levels of [a racial]
group when compared with society as a whole." 33
However, unlike the courts, the IRS has attempted to resolve the
latter three areas of uncertainty. First, it has focused on activities as
evidence of purposes as opposed to considering either activities or
purposes in isolation. 34 More specifically, it has taken the position
that acts that are illegal or contrary to public policy and that are also
a substantial part of an organization's activities (taking into account
the nature of the acts as well as their quantity) demonstrate a disqualifying non-charitable purpose. 35 Second, it has taken the position that activities can be contrary to fundamental public policy
even absent violations of any federal, state, or local laws, providing
30. See, e.g., supra note 14.
31. See id.
32. See infra notes 33-34.
33. IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-10-001 (Mar. 10, 1989); IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,792
(Aug. 17, 1987). See generally Samuel D. Brunson & David J. Herzig, A Diachronic Approach to Bob Jones: Religious Tax Exemptions after Obergefell, 92 IND. L.J. 1175, 1189-95
(2017).
34. IRS, Activities That are Illegal or Contrary to Public Policy, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM
FY 1985, at 109-10 (1984), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicj85.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LSH-XWS6].
35. Id.; Jean Wright & Jay H. Rotz, Illegality and Public Policy Considerations, in EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FY 1994, at 2 (1993), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl94.pdf
[https://perma.ccNFG2-BENE].
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the situations in Bob Jones University as examples. 36 Relatedly, the
IRS distinguishes between illegal activity, by which it means activity in violation of federal, state, or local statutes (usually criminal
ones), 37 and activity contrary to fundamental public policy, for
which it implicitly includes the modifier "federal," consistent with
the Supreme Court's focus on federal policy in the Bob Jones University case. 38 Third and finally, the IRS has taken the position that
churches should not be treated differently from any other type of
organization claiming the tax benefits available to charities: if
churches engage in "substantial" activities that are illegal or contrary to fundamental public policy, then they are disqualified from
receiving those benefits. 39 The question then becomes what activities of a church might be illegal or contrary to fundamental public
policy, with racial discrimination (assuming no church-run school)
not necessarily rising to that level. 40
This last IRS position is not without its critics. For example,
Professor Jerold Friedland concludes that the above-quoted footnote "suggests the Court intended to r.eserve its judgment on both
the public policy and first amendment issues with respect to racially discriminatory churches." 41 He therefore leaves open the possibility that the Court might conclude that applying the Bob Jones
University holding to churches violates the First Amendment. And
in an analysis written shortly before the Supreme Court's decision,
Professor Douglas Laycock argued that the First Amendment, and
36. IRS, supra note 34, at 114; Wright & Rotz, supra note 35, at 3.
37. See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (violations of local criminal ordinances); IRS,
supra note 34, at 110-11; Hatfield et al., supra note 14, at 3, 95-100; Wright & Rotz, supra
note 35, at 8, 10.
38~ See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593-95; IRS, supra note 34, at 114-15; Wright &
Rotz, supra note 35, at 3, 9-10. This reading is also consistent with an earlier federal
district court opinion that anticipated the Bob Jones University decision. See Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163-64 (D.D.C. 1971) (focusing on federal public policy).
39. IRS, supra note 34, at 110, 116-18; see also Wright & Rotz, supra note 35, at 19-20.
40. See Schachner, supra note 28, at 310.
41. Jerold A. Friedland, Constitutional Issues in Revoking Religious Tax Exemptions:
Church of Scientology of California v. Comm'r, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 565,587 (1985).
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particularly the concept of church autonomy, generally prohibited
government interference with the internal affairs of churches, including interference in the form of revoking the tax-exempt status
of racially discriminatory churches. 42
We will return to the first three areas of uncertainty in Part II,
when we discuss current and likely future areas of conflict between
churches and fundamental public policy. As for the application of
the Bob Jones University decision to churches generally, we will return to that unsettled issue in Part IV, after considering the basis for
the tax benefits provided to churches. Before considering the tax
treatment of churches more generally, however, it is worth describing the instances where the IRS has applied Bob Jones University specifically to churches.

B.
Subsequent Rulings and IRS Actions Involving
Churches
The IRS has rarely applied Bob Jones University to churches, perhaps taking to heart the now forty-year-old admonition of
Professor Stephen Schwarz that "in this delicate area, the Internal
Revenue Service would do well to halt at the gates of the church,
preserving valuable religious and associational rights in the process."43 Nevertheless, the IRS has entered those gates while waving
the Bob Jones University flag a handful of times.
In Synanon Church v. United States, 44 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia noted that, while the religious status of the organization at issue was in dispute, "[e]ven a bona fide church that

42. Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60
TEX. L. REV. 259, 261--63 (1982).
43. Stephen Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render unto Caesar, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 50, 91 (1976).
44. 579 F. Supp. 967 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd 820 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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failed the ... Bob Jones test would not be eligible for tax exemption."45 It "reluctantly" declined, however, to apply Bob Jones University to resolve the case based on acts and threats of physical violence by the organization's leaders and members because the
organization's fraud on the court provided a sufficient basis for ruling in the government's favor. 46
In Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 47 the U.S. Tax
Court upheld the revocation of tax-exempt status from the Church
of Scientology of California based in part on the proven conspiracy
by church leaders to impede the IRS in violation of federal criminal
law. These actions, the court concluded, demonstrated the church's
substantial illegal purpose. 48 In doing so, the court rejected the
church's argument that revocation was not permitted under the
First Amendment because a less restrictive means-criminal prosecution of the individual offenders-was available to address the
illegal activities. 49 However, on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit did not apply Bob Jones University because it
affirmed the Tax Court's decision on other grounds. 50
The IRS also revoked the tax-exempt status of the racist World
Church of the Creator, apparently based on the reasoning the Court
upheld in Bob Jones University, although the IRS likely made its decision before the Court issued that opinion.51 That organization
was, however, unable to challenge that revocation in court because

45. Id. at 971.
46. Id. at 978-79 (dismissing the case with prejudice because of fraud on the court
and so not reaching the merits of the government's tax exemption decision).
47. 83 T.C. 381 (1984), affd 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 502-09.
49. Id. at 503, 506-07.
50. Church of Scientology of Cal., 823 F.2d at 1315.
51. See Te-Ta-Ma Truth Foundation-Family of Uri, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 663-64 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Church of the Creator v. Comm'r, 707
F.2d 491 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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of a procedural failure, and so the IRS' s substantive position was
not subject to judicial review. 52
In 1988 the IRS issued a General Counsel Memorandum discussing the proposed revocation of a church's tax-exempt status because of how it operated a school. 53 Having found that the church
failed to meet its burden of showing that it operated the school in a
bona fide nondiscriminatory manner, the IRS further concluded
that since the church and school were apparently a single legal entity that was both an educational institution and a religious institution-a characterization the Supreme Court had applied to Bob
Jones University in its decision-it was appropriate to revoke the
tax-exempt status of that legal entity (and therefore of the church
as well as of the school). 54 While the Memorandum was redacted to
conceal the identity of the church and school involved, as required
by taxpayer privacy laws,55 the church almost certainly was the one
associated with the Goldsboro Christian Schools involved in the
Bob Jones University case. 56
Finally, in 2013 the IRS denied an application for recognition of
exemption under Section 501(c)(3) from a church with polygamy in

52. Church of the Creator, 707 F .2d at 492-93.
53. I.RS. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,754 Ouly 7, 1988).
54. Id.; see also Robert J. Desiderio, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS§ 14.04
(2018) (stating a church can avoid the application of this Memorandum and so protect
its own tax-exempt status by making a school that does not meet the requirements for
exemption a separate legal entity). This position was consistent with the IRS's announced position prior to the Bob Jones University decision. See Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1
C.B.158.
55. See I.RC.§ 6103 (2018); Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666,
668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming order requiring public disclosure of General Counsel's Memoranda under the Freedom of Information Act subject to redacting tax return
information protected by I.RC. § 6103).
56. See Oliver S. Thomas, The Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Arguments
for Church Tax Exemption and the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 605, 614
nn.57-58 (1992); Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Revokes Church Tax Exemption for First Time,
WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1988/
12/07/irs-revokes-church-tax-exemption-for-first-time/041f2d82-4706-4a2b-b0e4a83e2e8ff963/ [https://perma.cc/Q6C4-T9CT].

160

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 44

its beliefs and practices. 57 The IRS based the denial both on the organization's violation of state criminal law-a jury had found a
leader of the group guilty of bigamy-and of the federal (presumably fundamental) policy against bigamy. 58
These five instances therefore involved illegal criminal activity in
three cases, an uncertain basis for revocation in the fourth case, and
a church's operation of a racially discriminatory school (and indeed
a school that almost certainly was one of the subjects of the Bob Jones
University decision) in the fifth case. Therefore, despite the IRS' s
general statements that Bob Jones University applies to churches, 59 in
practice the IRS has applied that case to churches only in very limited circumstances. It is unclear, however, whether this reluctance
flows from a general sense of caution in this fraught area, a more
specific concern about avoiding any appearance of selectively targeting minority religious faiths, or a lack of instances where the IRS
knows there is a plausible case that a church is in fact acting contrary to fundamental public policy.
II.

CHURCHES AND FUNDAMENTAL PlIBLIC POLICY

This Part explores whether there are any current or likely future
conflicts between churches and fundamental public policy-even if
the IRS has so far not chosen to act with respect to them-that
would require considering if and how Bob Jones University applies
to churches. While the IRS and the courts have also applied the illegality aspect of the Bob Jones University holding to churches, our
focus will be on the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy aspect,
to the extent it goes beyond illegality. This is because recent instances of churches engaging in clearly illegal behavior appear to
be extremely rare, which is not surprising given that such behavior
could result in penalties for churches and their leaders that are
much more severe than any loss of tax benefits. For example, the
57. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-25-015 Oune 21, 2013).
58. Id.
59. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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First Church of Cannabis decided to avoid a confrontation with Indiana law enforcement authorities over sacramental use of marijuana even though it had already secured recognition of its tax-exempt status from the IRS. 60 That said, we will revisit the topic of
illegality in Part V, including whether only criminal illegality
should be a basis for a church losing tax benefits.
We begin by considering whether Bob Jones University should be
limited to racial discrimination, given the arguably unique history
of that form of discrimination in the United States. We conclude
that it should not, and therefore we then consider discrimination
on various other often prohibited grounds, including, but not limited to, sexual orientation. We also consider the sanctuary church
movement that seeks to protect undocumented immigrants from
enforcement of federal immigration laws and other possible conflict areas.
A.

Why the Uniqueness of Racial Discrimination in Educa-

tion Should Not Control
The IRS and ultimately the Supreme Court recognized that there
was a fundamental public policy against racial discrimination in
education. 61 However, the Court also noted that "[f]ew social or political issues in our history have been more vigorously debated and
more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimination,
particularly in education." 62 As Professor Olatunde Johnson states,

60. See Mark Alesia & Gabby Ferreira, Humor, love, police a strange mix at Cannabis
Church, lNDYSTAR Ouly 1, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/07/0l/humor-police-presence-mixed-cannabis-church-site/29561919 / [https://perma.cc/ND4NGGGJ]; John Tuohy, First Church of Cannabis wins IRS nonprofit status, INDYSTAR Oune
2, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/06/02/first-church-cannabis-winsirs-nonprofit-status/28357541/ [https://perma.cc/JBE9-3L8T]. While not required to apply for recognition of exemption under I.RC. § 501(c)(3), churches may voluntarily
choose to do so as the First Church of Cannabis apparently did. See I.RC.§ 508(c)(l)(A)
(exception from notification requirement to claim tax exemption under I.RC.
§ 50l(c)(3)); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLICATION 1828, at 3 (2015).
61. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,595 (1983).
62. Id.
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"the historical context ... provides ... crucial context for understanding the Court's decision." 63 That context included de facto continuing segregation in education through the creation of numerous
private schools, such as the Goldsboro Christian Schools, that limited their students to whites, often with the encouragement and
even financial support of southern state govemments. 64
None of the policies discussed below, and particularly not the
policies relating to sex discrimination and immigration that are the
most likely to qualify as fundamental currently, have a similar context. The longstanding religious teachings relating to the roles of
men and women both in religious leadership and more generally
are not being used to justify the creation of numerous segregated
or discriminatory institutions designed to frustrate the policy
against sex discrimination, although it must be acknowledged that
the effect of those teachings has been and still is significant within
those faiths that follow them. 65 Nor are longstanding religious
teachings relating to welcoming strangers and foreigners being
used to support the creation of new institutions to frustrate immigration laws, and the number of sanctuary churches and sheltered
immigrants appears to be relatively small. 66 If, therefore, Bob Jones

63. Johnson, supra note 14, at 128; see also KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMITIONS: NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? 163--67 (2016) (distinguishing opposing same-sex marriage from opposing interracial marriage in the context of determining appropriate exemptions from anti-discrimination laws, in part based on the history of racial
discrimination in the United States).
64. Johnson, supra note 14, at 131; see also Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity of
Religious Schools and Tax Exemption, 40 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 255, 317 (2017); Galston,
supra note 14, at 319; Herzig & Brunson, supra note 14, at 1116; Karla W. Simon, The TaxExempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAX L. REV. 477,477 (1981);
Sally Wagenmaker, Why Religious Organizations Shouldn't Lose Tax-Exempt Status Based
on Public Policy, Post-Obergefell, at 31 (2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=3104688 [https://perma.cc/6TAP-53AW].
65. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
66. See Thomas Scott-Railton, Note, A Legal Sanctuary: How the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Could Protect Sanctuary Churches, 128 YALE L.J. 408, 421-23 (2018); Kaitlyn
Schallhorn, What's a sanctuary church? A look at the policy and its legality in the US, Fox
NEWS Guly 17, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/whats-a-sanctuary-church-alook-at-the-policy-and-its-legality-in-us [https://perma.cc/E4KK-YWGD]; infra notes
114, 115, and accompanying text.

No.2]

Fundamental Public Policy for Churches

163

University is viewed as limited not only to "fundamental" public
policies but also to situations that are historically unusual if not
unique, in part because there is a concerted, large-scale effort to
frustrate the policy, it does not appear any of the current conflicts
rise to this level. 67
There are at least two significant problems with this approach,
however. First, that is simply not what the Court (or the IRS) said
with respect to the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine.
On its face, that doctrine provides that once an otherwise charitable
organization's activities are shown to be contrary to fundamental
public policy, and if those activities rise to a significant enough
level relative to the organization's overall activities, then the organization loses the tax benefits that usually come with that status. 68 It
does not matter whether the organization or its activities are new,
whether the organization is an outlier or part of a larger movement
opposing the policy at issue, or whether there are any other distinguishing historical characteristics. 69 Furthermore, this understanding of the doctrine is consistent with the overall approach of the
IRS, and the underlying statutes, with respect to tax benefits; organizations qualify or fail to qualify based on their characteristics and
actions, not generally based on the larger context in which they and
their actions exist.7°
Second, this approach creates another ambiguous line that has to
be drawn to determine if the doctrine applies. It would require the
IRS and courts to wrestle not only with whether a given public pol-

67. See David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption-Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 53-54 (2006);
Buckles, supra note 64, at 311-12; Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the
Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the
Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 1013 (2010). But see John D. Inazu, The Four
Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 837-43 (2014) (rejecting
the argument that racial discrimination is distinctly worse as compared to other forms
of discrimination such that the government is justified and permitted to prohibit racial
but not other forms of discrimination by private groups).
68. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,586, 591-92 (1983).
69. See id.
70. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3) (2018); Treas. Reg.§§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(a)-{c) (2018).
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icy is "fundamental," and whether an otherwise charitable organization's actions contrary to that policy are relatively significant, but
also whether those actions are somehow similar historically to racial discrimination. Such a determination is likely one that the IRS
is even more ill-suited to make than the fundamental public policy
determination. While the IRS is required to make the latter determination based on the position it asserted and the Court upheld in
Bob Jones University, that decision does not require the former determination. This distinguishing based on historical context approach therefore appears to be both legally unjustifiable and impractical.71
We therefore need to consider whether conflicts exist now, or are
likely to exist in the future, between the practices of a significant
number of churches and fundamental public policies.
B.

Discrimination in Employment, Services, and Member-

ship
This Part considers the types of discrimination currently disfavored in at least some contexts by federal law to determine whether
federal policy could either currently or in the near future rise to the
level of a fundamental public policy and, if it could, whether that
policy would conflict with the practices of a significant number of
churches. 72 More specifically, this Part details that while racial discrimination by private individuals and organizations is widely disfavored, federal law does not prohibit such discrimination in all
contexts. For example, in the employment context, federal law
reaches only organizations that have a certain number of employees.73 Federal law also does not generally prohibit racial discrimination with respect to the membership of private organizations, although in the wake of a court decision concluding that social clubs
71. See Brunson & Herzig, supra note 33, at 1206-07 (rejecting treating Bob Jones University as an outlier).
72. See id. at 1213-15 (considering the use of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish
a framework for applying the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018) (defining employer in the context of civil rights legislation as having fifteen or more employees).
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could qualify for tax exemption even if they discriminated on the
basis of race, Congress decided to deny exemption to social clubs if
they have a written policy that discriminates on the basis of race,
color, or religion. 74 And federal law prohibits racial discrimination
in the provision of goods or services only in certain industries that
provide public accommodations. 75 Similar limitations apply to federal law relating to disfavored discrimination of other types, such
as those based on ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, and veteran status. 76
In addition, the Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment requires what has come to be known as a "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination laws in order to protect the
ability of churches and other religious organizations, such as religious schools, to select their leaders. 77
1.

Racial, Ethnic, and National Origin Discrim-

ination
The employment context provides the strongest example of an
anti-discrimination policy that has become fundamental. As was
the case with racial discrimination in education when Bob Jones University was decided, federal government animus toward racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination in employment can be found
in a wide range of congressionally enacted statutes, executive

74. See I.R.C. § 501(i); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59 (D.D.C. 1972);
Langley & Conrad Rosenberg, Social Clubs-IRC 501(c)(7), in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 15 (1996), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc96.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU2H-7L VB].
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2018).
76. See, e.g., id. § 12101 (2018). But it is worth noting that not all types of discrimination are or should be prohibited. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and
the Nondiscrimination Norm, in MATTERS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND LEGAL
RESPONSE (Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming) (2012), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=2087599 [https://perma.cc/Y8W8-LG6B].
77. Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berm, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020);
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188-89
(2012).
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branch pronouncements, and judicial decisions. 7BThe Court has, as
noted previously, created a ministerial exception to these laws for
the employment of ministers by religious organizations under the
First Amendment.79 That the First Amendment may prohibit governments from flatly prohibiting such discrimination with respect
to ministerial employment does not, however, necessarily mean it
prohibits governments from conditioning tax benefits on not engaging in such discrimination.
But it is hard to identify any churches, much less a significant
number, that openly and defiantly discriminate on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin in employment.Bo The denominations
that historically were most supportive of first slavery and then racial segregation, such as the Southern Baptist Convention, have
now denounced racial discrimination in the strongest terms.Bl And
the denominations that historically have been affiliated with a particular racial minority, such as the National Baptist Convention, arguably do not run afoul of this federal policy because any bias they
have favors historically disadvantaged racial minorities.B2 This is
78. See David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy, and "Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 389, 403-04 (2000).
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. One minor exception may be churches with strong ethnic associations, such as
Orthodox Jewish synagogues and Russian or Greek Orthodox churches, that limit
membership to persons of the relevant ethic background or at least place additional
membership qualifications on a believer from outside the relevant ethnic group. See
Heather Miller Rubens, "Something Has Gone Wrong": The JFS Case and Defining Jewish
Identity in the Courtroom, 29 MD. J. INT'L L. 366, 368-69 (2014) (United Kingdom court
decision finding that the denial of preferential consideration for an applicant to a religious school was ethnic discrimination when it was based on their mother not being
considered Jewish and their unwillingness to undergo an Orthodox conversion); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1919, 1921 (2006) (asserting "Orthodox Jewish synagogues discriminate based on ethnicity ... in choosing rabbis and members").
81. See SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, RESOLUTION ON RACIAL RECONCILIATION
ON THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION (1995),
https://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/resolution-on-racial-reconciliationon-the-150th-anniversary-of-the-southem-baptist-convention/
[https://perma.cc/QMU9-7QQD].
82. See Brennen, supra note 78, at 439 (concluding that there is no clearly established
federal public policy against affirmative action).
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not to say there have not been credible allegations of isolated instances of racism; for example, in June 2018 the Southern Baptist
Convention expelled a church based on clear evidence of the
church's intentional discriminatory acts." 83 So while it is possible
that out of the hundreds of thousands of churches in the United
States84 the IRS might become aware of a handful that engage in
intentional racial discrimination in employment, the relative rareness of such practices among churches, the assumption that such
churches are likely to be small, and the First Amendment issues
raised by the existence of the ministerial exception, may understandably lead the IRS to decide to deploy its limited enforcement
resources elsewhere. Any conflict in this particular area would
therefore be rare to nonexistent.
With respect to the provision of goods and services, the federal
government also has a strong policy against racial discrimination,
but only with respect to the provision of certain goods and services
in a place of public accommodation" that affects interstate commerce or is supported by a state government (such as hotels, restaurants, and entertainment venues). 85 The limited reach of most
churches and the lack of direct state financial support for them
would seem to place them beyond the scope of that policy. While
hypothetically one can imagine a church that operated, for example, a hotel open to the public, similar to the Second Baptist Church
of Goldsboro's operating the Goldsboro Christian Schools (through
the same legal entity as the church), as a practical matter such a situation is likely to be rare or nonexistent. (In addition, when a
II

II

83. Carma Henry, Georgia Church Expelled from Southern Baptist Convention Over Racial
Discrimination Charges, WESTSIDE GAZETTE CTune 13, 2018), https://thewestsidegazette.com/georgia-church-expelled-from-southem-baptist-convention-over-racial-discrimination-charges/ [https://perma.cc/X84O-KKN A].
84. Fast Facts About American Religion, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RESEARCH,
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/research/fastfacts/fast_facts.html#numcong
[https://perma.cc/W96W-SADP].
85. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Of course it is not always clear whether
a group is providing a "public accommodation." See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Associations
and the Constitution: Four Questions about Four Freedoms, 92 N.C. L. REV. 917, 924-27
(2014).
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church engages in racial discrimination that "can reasonably be expected to aggravate the disparity in the educational, economic, or
social levels of [a racial] group when compared with society as a
whole," 86 such as by operating a racially discriminatory school, the
government's interest in extending the contrary-to-fundamentalpublic-policy doctrine to the church is arguably strong enough to
overcome the arguments advanced in this Article for not doing so
with respect to churches generally. 87 )
Finally, with respect to membership, the IRS Chief Counsel's office has concluded that "exclud[ing] from participation in or
den[ying] the benefits of a program or activity to individuals solely
on the basis of race so that it can be reasonably be expected to aggravate the disparity in the educational, economic, or social levels
of that group when compared with society as a whole" violates fundamental public policy. 88 It is not clear, however, that this conclusion extends to membership in a church or attendance at a church
gathering, absent clear evidence such membership or attendance
provides significant educational, economic, or social benefits, particularly given the First Amendment associational as well as free
exercise concerns raised by such an extension. Therefore, even if the
IRS became aware of a church that intentionally engaged in racial
discrimination with respect to its membership or attendancewhich appears to be a rare circumstance under any conditions-it
likely would rightly conclude that such behavior does not rise to
the level of being contrary to fundamental public policy. 89 Therefore, while prohibiting racial discrimination in some, but not all,

86. I.RS. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-10-001 (Mar. 10, 1989); I.RS. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,792
(Aug. 17, 1987).
87. See infra text accompanying note 367.
88. Supra note 33.
89. While the IRS did revoke the tax-exempt status of a racist church apparently
based on Bob Jones University, both IRS's reasoning and the facts it deemed relevant are
unclear. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. It is therefore impossible to tell if that
decision was inconsistent with the above-cited I.RS. General Counsel Memorandum,
which Memorandum was later in time and so presumably would be a better indication
of the IRS's position in this respect under any conditions. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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contexts almost certainly is a fundamental public policy, an actual
conflict is unlikely in those contexts because of the lack of such behavior by a significant number of churches. 90
2.

Sex Discrimination

While intentional racial discrimination appears to be rare among
churches, intentional sex discrimination is much more widespread.
The most obvious example is the position taken by many religious
institutions, including the Catholic Church, a significant number of
Protestant churches, more theologically conservative Jewish synagogues, and some bodies in other religions, that certain leadership
roles are reserved for men. Some faiths also explicitly teach that
women and men have different roles in society more generally. 91
Beyond explicit policies with respect to leadership and societal
roles, there has also been at least one recent public dispute in a major denomination relating to the treatment of women. In a decision
that was controversial within that denomination, a Southern Baptist seminary decided to fire a longtime Southern Baptist leader in
the wake of criticism for his alleged treatment of and teachings
about women, including how he responded to two students who
90. Outside of the church context, there has been speculation (but no IRS rulings or
other guidance) that tax-exempt hate groups promoting white supremacy may now
run afoul of the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine, notwithstanding First
Amendment concerns. See, e.g., David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Opinion, White
Supremacist Groups Don't Deserve Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/opinion/white-supremacists-tax-exemptions.html [https://nyti.ms/2weafrQ]; Darryll K. Jones, House of Representatives Passes
Resolution Condemning Hate Speech: Fundamental Public Policy Yet?, NONPROFIT LAW
PROF BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2019/01/
house-of-representatives-passes-resolution-condemning-hate-speech-fundarnentalpublic-policy-yet.htrnl [https://perma.cc/9GTF-VHMM].
91. See, e.g., THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, THE FAMILY: A
PROCLAMATION TO THE WORLD (1995) (teaching that, "[b]y divine design, fathers are to
preside over their families in love and righteousness and are responsible to provide the
necessities of life and protection for their families. Mothers are primarily responsible
for the nurture of their children"). See generally Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's
Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453,458 n.30
& 459-69 (1992); Caroline Mala Corbin, Expanding the Bob Jones Compromise, in LEGAL
RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 123, 133, 147-49 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
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alleged they had been sexually assaulted by others and his teachings regarding "the Bible's view of women and his belief that
spousal abuse is not grounds for divorce." 92
The key question in this context is therefore whether federal government policies relating to sex discrimination, in the employment
context and beyond, have become fundamental. The Court in Bob
Jones University made this determination with respect to racial discrimination in education by looking at the extent of actions of the
three branches of the federal government and the time period over
which those branches consistently opposed such discrimination. 93
With respect to sex discrimination, Congress included in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a prohibition on discrimination in
employment on the basis of sex and a year earlier enacted the Equal
Pay Act, which prohibited paying women and men unequally for
equal work. 94 It also enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, which prohibited sex discrimination in education programs receiving federal funds and broadened the reach of that provision in 1988, including refusing to exclude churches. 95
While initially the federal courts resisted a robust prohibition on
sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the past forty or so years state action involving such discrimination has been subject to an "intermediate"
level of scrutiny (somewhere between the "strict scrutiny" that applies to racial discrimination and the rational basis scrutiny that applies generally). 96 This level of scrutiny led to, for example, the Supreme Court concluding that the male-only admissions policy of

92. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Southern Baptist seminary drops bombshell: Why Paige Patterson was fired, WASH. POST Gune 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/06/0l/southem-baptist-seminary-dropsbombshell-why-paige-patterson-was-fired [https://perma.cc/ST7G-FB5X].
93. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593-95 (1983); see also Hatfield et
al., supra note 14, at 3.
94. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
95. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2018); Stephen L. Mikochik, Caesar's Coin: Federal
Funds, Civil Rights, and Churches, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 193, 193-94 (1991).
96. See Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317,
1328-29 (2018).
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the Virginia Military Institute, a public university, violated the
Constitution. 97 The executive branch not only has long prohibited
sex discrimination in government employment generally but, for
example, has increasingly permitted women to seek combat positions in the military, most recently graduating the first female Marines from its infantry officer course in the wake of the decision to
open all combat roles to women. 98 Even without the ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution, 99 it therefore appears that prohibiting sex discrimination, at least in the employment context, is now a fundamental public policy since all
three branches of the federal government now have a decades-long,
broad, and consistent policy of rejecting it. 100 While the IRS has in
the past decided that sex discrimination was not "clearly contrary
to public policy," 101 those decisions do not reflect these more recent
legal developments. Some commentators have therefore called
upon the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of religious organizations that engage in this type of discrimination. 102
97. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,519 (1996).
98. See Kevin Lui, In a Landmark First, the U.S. Marines Now Has a Female Infantry Officer, TIME (Sept. 26, 2017), https://time.com/4956767/us-marines-first-female-infantryofficer [https://perma.cc/S2KV-EL68].
99. The ratification of the ERA by Virginia on January 15, 2020 does not necessarily
mean the ERA is now part of the Constitution, both because Congress placed a time
limit on ratification that expired in 1982 and because several states have rescinded their
previous ratifications. Darlene Ricker, What does Equal Rights Amendment ratification in
Virginia mean for its chances?, ABA JOURNAL Oan. 16, 2020), http://www.abajournal.com/web/article/era-ratification-in-virginia-doesnt-seal-its-fate-timing-is-everything [https://perma.ccNL3P-3F2Q].
100. See Hatfield et al., supra note 14, at 40.
101. See, e.g., I.RS. Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-44-007 Ouly 28, 1977); Moritz v. Comm'r, 55
T.C. 113, 115 (1970).
102. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 91, at 485; Corbin, supra note 91, at 134-35, 156-58; cf
Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the
Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 61-63 (1972) (arguing that the tax benefits enjoyed
by most tax-exempt organizations are sufficient to render them state actors and so prohibited from discriminating on various grounds, including sex). But see COREY
BRETISCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? 134-36 (2012) (arguing that the position of at least some churches with respect to women and homosexual people is not so clearly opposed to the ideal of free and equal citizenship to justify
removing their federal income tax benefits); Timothy J. Tracey, Bob Jonesing: Same-Sex
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So why has the IRS not acted in this area? A cynical explanation
is that the IRS is much weaker politically than it was in the 1970s
and so has no stomach for the backlash that would undoubtedly
occur if it were to pursue such a controversial course of action. 103 A
more principled explanation is that the IRS has concluded that since
such discrimination most commonly occurs with respect to the selection of religious leaders, the constitutionally based ministerial
exception-not at issue in Bob Jones University-would prevent revoking the tax-exempt status of a religious organization that engages in such discrimination.
3.

Sexual Orientation Discrimination

As is the case with sex discrimination, many faiths intentionally
discriminate on the basis of either conduct associated with sexual
orientation104 or, less commonly, sexual orientation itself. 105 Such
discrimination is almost certainly more pervasive than sex discrimination, particularly given that many faiths believe that same-sex
sexual relationships are inherently wrong, potentially disqualifying
Marriage and the Hankering to Strip Religious Institutions of Their Tax-Exempt Status, 11
FIU L. REV. 85, 92 (2015) (concluding without much discussion that sex discrimination
is not contrary to fundamental public policy).
103. See generally Amy Moore, Rife with Latent Power: Exploring the Reach of the IRS to
Determine Tax-Exempt Status According to Public Policy Rationale in an Era of Judicial Deference, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 117, 138, 156-57 (2014) (arguing Chevron deference "has made
the IRS rife with [latent] power" that Congress can choose to use when it becomes politically prudent).
104. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, '!['I[ 2357-2359 (2016) (distinguishing between homosexual conduct, which is "intrinsically disordered," and homosexual
orientation);
CHRISTIAN
REFORMED
CHURCH,
HOMOSEXUALITY,
https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/position-statements/homosexuality
[https://perma.cc/UB7M-7H53] (distinguishing between individuals with a homosexual orientation, who can fully participate in the life of the church, and individuals practicing homosexuality, which is identified as sinful); SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION,
RESOLUTION ON HOMOSEXUALITY, (1988), http://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/resolution-on-homosexuality-5/ [https://perma.cc/SHD4-69AF] (citations omitted) ('That we maintain that while God loves the homosexual and offers salvation, homosexuality is not a normal lifestyle and is an abomination in the eyes of God.").
105. Denny Burk, Is Homosexual Orientation Sinful?, ERLC (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://er le.com/resource-library /articles/is-homosexual-orientation-sinful
[https://perma.cc/YXW3-ZH9R] (arguing that homosexual orientation, and not just behavior, is sinful).
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those involved in such relationships from leadership roles and even
from membership. 106
However, commentators generally acknowledge that the federal
government as a whole has not taken a consistent position against
such discrimination, much less a strong and longstanding position
sufficient to render this policy fundamental. 107 Then-IRS Commissioner Koskinen appeared to take this position in 2015 as well, although he left the door open for reconsideration in the future. 108 It is
true that the Supreme Court in the recent case of Bostock v. Clayton
County takes the position that Congress has long outlawed sexual
orientation discrimination in employment by outlawing discrimination based on sex. 109 But the repeated failure of Congress to enact
an explicit prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination indicates at least some inconsistency in that branch's position. 110 The
Obergefell oral argument exchange was therefore at best premature;
whether such discrimination by churches or other religious organizations ever truly becomes an "issue" the IRS and courts will need
to wrestle with, it certainly does not rise to that level yet. This is
106. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section 501(c)(3) Exemption of Religious Organizations That Discriminate, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 715,
717-19 (2009) (providing examples).
107. See, e.g., CONG. RsCH. SERV., R44244, RECOGNITTON OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS 27 (2015); Brunson & Herzig, supra note 33, at
1187; Buckles, supra note 64, at 308-10; Hatfield, supra note 14, at 90; Nicholas Mirkay,
Is It Charitable to Discriminate: The Necessary Transformation of Section 501(c)(3) into the
Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 45, 67-68 (2007); Tracey, supra note 102, at
92-93; Wagenmaker, supra note 64, at 24-27; Kirsten Berg & Moiz Syed, Under Trump,
LGBTQ Progress Is Being Reversed in Plain Sight, PROPuBLICA, (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://projects. propublica.org/graphics/lgbtq-rights-rollback [https://perma.cc/S3V38L5M]. But see Dyllan Moreno Taxman, What About Bob? The Continuing Problem of Federally-Subsidized LGB Discrimination in Higher Education, 34 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 39,
64-65 (2019) (arguing that at least some forms of sexual orientation discrimination, such
as not providing housing to same-sex married couple on the same basis as to oppositesex married couples, may now be contrary to fundamental public policy).
108. Hearing on Revisiting IRS Targeting: Progress of Agency Reforms and Congressional
Options Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Fed. Rts. and Fed. Cts. of the S.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of John Koskinen, Internal Revenue Service Commissioner).
109. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020).
110. See id. at 1822-24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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particularly true given the protection provided to religiously motivated actions by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which, as
the Court in Bostock noted, requires the government to have a compelling interest and use the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest when substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion.111 But if it did rise to the level of a fundamental public policy
at some point in the future, it would likely raise issues similar to
those that the IRS currently faces with respect to sex discrimination
and which will be explored further in Part V below.
4.

Other Forms of Discrimination

The federal government also prohibits discrimination based on
certain other grounds in some contexts, including employment.
Such other grounds include religion, age, disability, and veteran
status. 112 Congress has understandably exempted religious organizations from the statutory prohibition on religious discrimination
in employment, 113 however, and there is no reason to conclude that
the application of this particular policy would apply to churches in
any other context. As for age and disability, as with racial discrimination, it appears that churches intentionally discriminating on
these bases, whether in employment, provision of goods and services, or membership, are rare to nonexistent and therefore unlikely
to create a significant conflict even if these policies are considered
fundamental. Finally, one could imagine that those faiths with a
pacifist tradition might discriminate against veterans in employment decisions, particularly for religious leaders, but it is more
likely that they would discriminate based on whether an individual
currently holds pacifist beliefs, which a veteran certainly could, rather than veteran status itself. So none of these federally disfavored
bases for making decisions are likely to result in significant conflicts
under Bob Jones University.

111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2018); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
112. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).
113. See id.§ 2000e-l(a).
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Protecting and Serving Undocumented Immigrants

The increasingly heated debates over immigration raise a possible point of conflict outside of the discrimination context. Some
churches have provided sanctuary for immigrants who are in this
country illegally to protect them from possible deportation actions,
based on the churches' religious convictions.11 4 To date the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has criticized such actions but not pursued criminal or civil charges against the churches involved or their
leaders. 115 However, this was not the case in the 1980s, when the
federal government successfully prosecuted individuals associated
with the sanctuary movement. 116 At least one commentator has argued pursuing such charges today might run afoul of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, enacted in 1993. 117 But should the IRS reconsider the tax benefits enjoyed by these churches under Bob Jones
University even absent a finding by the DOJ or the courts that such
activities are illegal?

114. See Schallhorn, supra note 66; Bobby Allyn & Michel Marizco, Jury Acquits Aid
Worker Accused Of Helping Border-Crossing Migrants in Arizona, NPR, (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/11/21/781658800/jury-acquits-aid-worker-accused-of-helping-border-crossing-migrants-in-arizona [https://perma.cc/KLMS-HZFG] (describing
how a humanitarian aid worker employed by Unitarian Universalist Church-affiliated
ministry was acquitted of helping migrants). The legal history of sanctuary, particularly
under common law, is lengthy and complicated. See generally JOHN BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HlsTORY 553-54 (5th ed. 2019).
115. See Church Sanctuary for Illegal Aliens, 7 Op. O.L.C. 168 (1983),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/l 983/10/31/op-olc-v007p0168_0. pdf [https://perma.cc/8RHM-NCP3] (criticizing practice and concluding any
asserted legal defenses would be insufficient); Jason Hanna, Can churches provide legal
sanctuary
to
undocumented
immigrants,
CNN
(Feb.
17,
2017),
https://www .cnn.com/2017/02/17/us/immigrants-sanctuary-churches-legality-tmd/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z9P2-CAWD] (reporting that "[i]n general, prosecutors
probably won't go after a pastor" according to a former DOJ Office of Immigration
Litigation assistant attorney general).
116. See generally Scott-Railton, supra note 66, at 417-19.
117. See id. at 419, 433-49.
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The history of immigration and immigration laws in the United
States is lengthy and complicated, including with respect to enforcement of those laws. 118 That said, Congress has certainly enacted laws limiting immigration and imposing penalties-primarily deportation-for violations of those laws, and the executive
branch and the courts have a long history of enforcing and applying
those laws and penalties. 119 While it could be argued that the degree
of enforcement varies among administrations, preventing the deportation of immigrants who are in the United States illegally appears to be contrary to fundamental public policy given the decades-long support of all three branches for deportation of many
immigrants in the country illegally. 120
Professor Ellen P. Aprill has considered this issue and is skeptical
that the IRS would pursue revocation of tax exemption in sanctuary
situations for a variety of reasons, including the lack of a clear finding of illegal activity by the DOJ, the fact that providing such sanctuary would likely be a relatively small part of a given church's activities, the limited resources of the IRS, and the historical
unwillingness of the IRS to expand the application of the contraryto-fundamental-public-policy doctrine beyond racial discrimination in education. 121 That said, she acknowledges that in theory the
IRS could apply the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine in this context to strip sanctuary churches of their federal tax

118. See generally WALTER A. EWING, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION
POL'Y CTR., OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY (2012), https://americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/opportunity_exclusion_Oll312.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRM7-QPGY].
119. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007).
120. See, e.g., Alex Nowrasteh, Deportation Rates in Historical Perspective, CATO AT LIBERTY (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.cato.org/blog/deportation-rates-historical-perspective [https://perma.cc/HZF4-7MKF] (finding more than 100,000 deportations per year
under the administration of President Bill Clinton and every presidential administration since).
121. See Ellen P. Aprill, Religious Organizations, Refuge for Undocumented Immigrants,
and Tax Exemption, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2017-28, 1-5 (2017).
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benefits.122 This area therefore may be another current conflict under the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine of Bob Jones

University.
D.

Other Possible Conflicts

Additionally, relatively rare situations in which a church runs
afoul of Bob Jones University have arisen or could arise, including
with respect to polygamy, marijuana, human rights violations, and
sexual abuse. For example, the IRS has denied tax-exempt status as
recently as 2013 to organizations that supported the (state law)
criminal activity of polygamy, which the IRS concluded was also
contrary to federal public policy. 123 The IRS based those denials on
multiple grounds, including that support of polygamy is necessarily both support for violating state laws and contrary to fundamental federal policy. 124 Despite their illegality, plural marriages
are still somewhat common in the United States. 125 And across the
globe, there are possibly more polygamous societies than there are
monogamous ones. 126 Most relevant to the current discussion, some
American churches endorse the practice as part of their religion,
particularly the fundamentalist Latter Day Saints churches. 127 In addition, one report estimates that anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000

122. See id. at 4-5.
123. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 2013-25-015 CTnne 21, 2013) (involving a church); IRS Priv.
Ltr. Ru!. 2013-23-025 CTnne 7, 2013) (involving a non-church educational and charitable
organization). Despite the recent legal victories for same-sex marriage, it seems rmlikely that there will be similar victories in the near future for polygamy. See, e.g., John
Witte, Jr., Why No Polygamy, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION INF AMILYLAW 44666 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018).
124. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 2013-25-015, supra note 57; see also I.RS. Priv. Ltr. Ru!.
2013-23-025, supra note 57.
125. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Jessica Bennett,
Polyamory:
The
Next
Sexual
Revolution?,
NEWSWEEK CTuly 28, 2009),
https://www .newsweek.com/polyamory-next-sexual-revolution-82053
[https://perma.cc/S9PX-9YTC] (estimating 500,000 polyamorous families in the United
States)).
126. Jack B. Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHION.U. L. REV. 89, 94 (2015).
127. See, e.g., Jason D. Berkowitz, Beneath the Veil of Mormonism: Uncovering the Truth
About Polygamy in the United States and Canada, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 615, 616
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Muslims currently live in polygamous families in the United
States. 128 So while to date it appears few organizations and even
fewer churches have both explicitly supported the practice of polygamy and sought IRS recognition of tax-exempt status-the 2013
denials being an outlier-it is certainly possible that more conflicts
over this issue could occur in the future.
In contrast and as mentioned earlier, the IRS appears not to have
had a problem with recognizing the tax-exempt status of a church
that was candid regarding its intent to incorporate marijuana use
into its religious rituals despite the fact that such use was illegal
under federal law and under the law of the state where the church
was located. 129 And while this church is not unique, in that there
also a number of such churches in California,13° it does not appear
the IRS is challenging the tax-exempt status of any of them. However, because the IRS does not generally provide explanations for
rulings recognizing tax-exempt status or for why it is not choosing
to challenge the existing tax-exempt status of an organization, 131 it
is unclear why it is taking this position. And, of course, its position
could change if the federal government decides to more aggressively prosecute marijuana offenses.
Some churches might also support or directly engage in activities
that violate human rights. For example, some churches, particularly
(2007); see also Eve D'Onofrio, Child Brides, Inegalitarianism, and the Fundamentalist Polygamous Family in the United States, 19 INT'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAM. 373, 375-76 (2005).
128. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy, NPR
(May 27, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90857818
[https://perma.cc/VE2N-VBLX].
129. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
130. See Arit John, Inside the War For California's Cannabis Churches, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov.
23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ll/23/style/weed-church-california.html
[https://nyti.ms/2OA WCLn].
131. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS COMPLAINT PROCESS FOR TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
2
(2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-08-13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KH9N-YGGB] (noting that the IRS is prohibited from publicly disclosing whether it has initiated an examination or the result of any examination); Terri
Lynn Helge, Rejecting Charity: Why the IRS Denies Tax Exemption to 501(c)(3) Applicants,
14 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 2 (2016) (stating that favorable IRS tax exemption determination
letters "do[] not set forth the reasons why the organization's application was approved").
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ones that could be characterized as cults, might actively work to
prevent individuals from leaving the church. 132 Other possible human rights violations could include pressuring spouses to stay in
abusive marriages, or, some would argue, putting church members
through "gay conversion therapy." 133 The latter is unlikely to constitute the contravention of a fundamental public policy, even
though now outlawed in some states, 134 but certainly allowing individuals to choose their faith is a longstanding human right recognized by the federal government, 135 and preventing domestic violence has (albeit more recently) also attained that status. 136
However, in practice, such activities rarely rise to the level of legally
actionable coercion and, when they do, likely also involve illegal
criminal actions that would provide a clearer basis for loss of taxexempt status if a church directly engaged in such actions. 137 The
IRS therefore might not face a situation where a church has engaged

132. See Cecilia M. Weigel, Note, Trafficking Cults: Why Courts Should Adopt a Broad
Reading of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act to Ensure Protection of Cult Victims, 30 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 272 (2020) ("In some instances, cults force their members to stay
within the group.").
133. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Overlooked Costs of Religious Deference, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363, 1373-77 (2007) (reporting findings that "[r]eligious groups
often acquiesce in or, worse, condone family violence within the community"); Susan
L. Morrow & A. Lee Beckstead, Conversion Therapies for Same-Sex Attracted Clients in
Religious Conflict: Context, Predisposing Factors, Experiences, and Implications for Therapy,
32 COUNSELING PSYCH. 641, 642 (2004).
134. See Equality Maps: Conversion Therapy Laws, MOVEMENT ADVAN CEMENT PROJECT, https://www .lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion_therapy [https://perma.cc/
R6UD-GT2G); Derrick Bryson Taylor, Colorado Bans "Conversion Therapy" for Minors,
N.Y. 11MES, Oune 1, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/0l/us/gay-conversiontherapy-colorado.html [https://nyti.ms/2EHSbu7) (finding that eighteen states have
banned conversion therapy for minors).
135. See UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Art. 18 (approved by United
States); INT'L COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLffiCAL RIGHTS, Art. 18 (ratified by United
States).
136. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat.
1902.
137. See Hava Dayan, Modern Day Slavery: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Slavery-Like Offences in Charismatic Cults, 23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 42 n.3 (2016); Weigel, supra
note 132, at 274 (asserting that courts in the United States generally do not find psychological coercion alone sufficient to provide the basis for a civil legal claim).
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in such activities in such a way that violates fundamental public
policy but does not constitute illegal criminal activity.
Finally, the recent scandals involving various churches and alleged or proven sexual abuse could implicate the Bob Jones University decision but are unlikely to do so. There are few if any claims
that the churches in question intentionally endorsed or directed
such behavior, and so such behavior should not be attributed to
them for tax exemption purposes. This remains the case even
though liability might and often has attached to churches arising
out of negligence relating to such abuse, under a theory of vicarious
liability, or because of intentional efforts to cover up misbehavior
that led to further abuse. 138

* * *
In conclusion, there are at least several areas of current or likely
future conflict between many churches and fundamental public
policy, including sex discrimination in employment, sexual orientation discrimination in employment, sanctuary provision to undocumented immigrants, and polygamy. It is therefore necessary
to determine how Bob Jones University should be applied to
churches involved in such conflicts.
III.

CHURCHES AND TAXES

Churches have historically often enjoyed tax exemptions and
other tax benefits, as have their leaders. However, the exemptions
and other benefits have not always been blanket ones, in large part
because of their complicated history and their shifting justifications.139 This Part first briefly summarizes the existing tax benefits
138. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & Aaron H. Cole, The Bishop's Alter Ego: Enterprise Liability and the Catholic Priest Sex Abuse Scandal, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 65, 68
(2007); Mayo Moran, Cardinal Sins: How the Catholic Sexual Abuse Crisis Changed Private
Law, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 95, 136-41 (2019).
139. See, e.g., NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, PoLmCS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 71-72 (2011); DEIRDRE DESSINGUE, The
Special Case of Churches, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 173, 173-74 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002).
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for such organizations in the United States and related conditions
on them, then considers the constitutional provisions that may either support or conflict with the existence of these benefits, and finally addresses the reasons put forward to support them.
A.

Existing Law

Bob Jones University related to federal tax benefits, so it is appropriate to start there, especially since, for churches, those benefits are
more extensive than those enjoyed by non-church religious organizations.140 But there are also many tax benefits provided to
churches at the state and local level, so this Part briefly discusses
those benefits as well.
1.

Federal Tax Law

Perhaps the most commonly known benefit, which churches
share with other types of charities, is exemption from federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3). That provision extends exemption to "[c]orporations, and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals." 141 This exemption is conditional in several ways, beyond the fundamental public policy condition upheld in the Bob
Jones University decision. More specifically, Section 501(c)(3) denies
exemption to an otherwise qualified organization if it distributes its
net earnings to a private party, engages in a substantial amount of
lobbying, or supports or opposes any candidate for elected public
office. 142 This exemption is also not unlimited, as it does not extend
to "unrelated business taxable income" -oversimplifying, income

140. See Robert H. Wood, Why Churches Are the Gold Standard of Tax-Exempt Organizations,
FORBES
(Sept.
22,
2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/09/22/lets-tax-churches/?sh=6flc608b322b
[https://perma.cc/VM2SNVL8].
141. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (2018).
142. See id.
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from any regularly carried on trade or business that is not substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose (and does not
fall within a statutorily provided exception). 143 A closely related
benefit that is available to almost all Section 501(c)(3) organizations
is the ability to receive donations that qualify as deductible charitable contributions for donors; such donations are also generally exempt from federal estate and gift taxes. 144 Along with other 50l{c)(3)
organizations, churches are also exempt from federal unemployment tax. 145
Churches enjoy a number of tax benefits generally not enjoyed by
other 501(c)(3)s, including exemption from initial application and
annual information return requirements and special protections relating to tax inquiries and examinations. 146 Ministers-that is ordained, commissioned, or licensed religious leaders who usually
although not always serve in churches-also enjoy a number of significant tax benefits, including the ability to exclude from their taxable income the value of housing provided to them by a church or
cash compensation paid to them to provide housing. 147
Particularly since some benefits are only available to churches as
opposed to all 501(c)(3)s, the IRS has had to determine what qualifies as a "church" for these purposes. The IRS uses a fourteen-factor
test, although an organization does not have to satisfy all fourteen
factors to qualify. 148 The courts have used this test and also an "associational test" that considers whether the organization has a

143. See id.§§ 511-514.
144. See id.§§ 170(a), (c)(2), 2055 (a)(2), 2522(a)(2).
145. See id.§ 3306(c)(8).
146. See id.§§ 508(c)(l)(A), 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), 7611.
147. See id. § 107. This cash compensation aspect of the ministerial housing benefit
was recently the subject of an ultimately unsuccessful constitutional challenge. See infra
note 180. Other special tax benefits for churches and ministers relate to retirement plans
and payroll taxes. See I.RC. §§ 410(c)(l)(B), 411(e)(l)(B), 412(e)(2)(D), 414(c)(2), (e),
1402(a)(8), (e) (2018).
148. See Spiritual Outreach Soc'y v. Comm'r, 927 F.2d 335,338 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing
Remarks of IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz, PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax
Planning Gan. 9, 1978), reprinted in Fed. Taxes (P-H) 'l[ 54,820 (1978)); I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 88-33-001 (May 2, 1988); I.RS. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977); INTERNAL
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group of individuals that meets regularly for worship and other religious purposes. 149 The relative vagueness of both tests is driven in
significant part by the need to accommodate "churches" of all faiths
or even of arguably none. 150
2.

State and Local Tax Law

States and localities of course also impose a variety of taxes, including income, property, and sales and use taxes. In general, most
5O1(c)(3)s qualify for exemption from these taxes in most states and
localities, including almost always churches, although the scope
and conditions related to them vary widely. 151 However and in
common with other 5O1(c)(3)s, churches often do not qualify for exemption from levies that are characterized as user fees or similarly
tied to the provision of particular services, such as trash collection.1s2

REVENUE SERV., "CHURCHES" DEFINED, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/churches-religious-organizations/churches-defined [https://perma.cc/9EG7-AUQ4].
The IRS first faced the difficult task of determining what constituted a church when
Congress initially enacted the unrelated business income tax, which in its original form,
exempted churches (and conventions and associations of churches) from this tax. See,
e.g., Maggie Flynn, Witchcraft and Tax Exempt Status Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 763, 788 (1987); Schwarz, supra note 43, at 64-67; Wendy
Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PIIT. L. REV. 345, 350-51
(1990); Bruce Nevin Shortt, The Establishment Clause and Religion-Based Categories: Taking
Entanglement Seriously, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145, 166--67 (1982).
149. See Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 614 F.3d 1383, 1388-89
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
150. See Wash. Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Washington Ethical Society, GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org/profile/52-0796318
[https://perma.cc/QEN2-547C].
151. See Mark J. Cowan, Nonprofits and the Sales and Use Tax, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1077,
1096 (sales and use tax), 1184-86 (property tax) (2010); John L. Mikesell, State Retail Sales
Tax Treatment of Nonprofits, 64 EXEMIT ORG. TAX REV. 37, 41-42, 44-45 (2009); 50-State
Chart of Nonprofit State Tax Exemptions, NONPROFIT STARTUP GUIDE, https://www.harborcompliance.com/information/nonprofit-income-sales-use-tax-exemptions-by-state
[https://perma.cc/6ERM-G4ETI.
152. See DAPHNE A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, THE PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION
FOR NONPROFITS AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS FOR CmES 5--6 (2011), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/property-tax-exemption-nonprofits-and-revenue-implications-cities/view/full_report. (https://perma.cc/3DUG-YZGF].
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Constitutional Reasons for Tax Benefits

The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " 153 The application of this provision to taxation of churches is far from clear.
Both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause have
been invoked to support exempting churches from taxation and
other tax benefits, while the Establishment Clause has also been invoked as a basis for holding such benefits invalid. 154 This Part considers each clause in tum.
1.

Free Exercise Clause

The Free Exercise Clause argument is that the taxation of a
church's income would place a substantial burden on the exercise
of religion both by directly reducing the financial resources of the
church and by imposing other costs on the church, including administrative costs and potential chilling effects. 155 The argument
can also be extended to the taxation of funds provided by donors
to the church (if such donors are not permitted to deduct their contributions), although it is obviously weaker in that context, and to
some if not all of the other tax benefits enjoyed by churches at both
the federal and state levels. 156 The counterargument is that a mere
reduction in financial resources that is not targeted at churches but
instead is generally applicable to all organizations is not a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, and that even if it were it is
more than justified by the revenue needs of the state. 157

153. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
154. See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 55-56 (summarizing but not endorsing this
argument); Christine Roemhildt Moore, Comment, Religious Tax Exemption and the
"Charitable Scrutiny" Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 308--09 (2002) (same).
156. See, e.g., J. Michael Martin, Should the Government Be in the Business of Taxing
Churches?, 29 REGENTU. L. REV. 309, 321-22 (2017).
157. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Legal Theories of Tax Exemption: A Sovereignty Perspective,
in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 145, 160 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002) [hereinafter Brody, Legal Theories]; Simon, supra note 64, at 505-07; see also Hernandez v.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts have favored the counterargument even though they have not squarely ruled in its favor with
respect to churches. 158 Even before the Supreme Court decided in
Employment Division v. Smith 159 that the Free Exercise Clause does
not provide a defense for violations of neutral laws of general applicability, the Court repeatedly denied free exercise claims that
sought exemptions from generally applicable taxes. 16°For example,
in United States v. Lee, 161 the Supreme Court refused to exempt an
Amish employer from paying Social Security taxes-to which he
objected on religious grounds- because of the government's compelling interest in the uniform application of the social security tax
systern. 162 And as already noted, the Court in Bob Jones University
rejected the claim that the Free Exercise Clause barred the federal
government from revoking the tax benefits enjoyed by the religious
schools involved. 163 In addition, attempts by religious organizations
to challenge other conditions on tax exemption relating to political
activity based on the Free Exercise Clause have failed in federal appellate courts. 164 The courts have also rejected Free Exercise Clause
challenges to other requirements for Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status. 165 The only exceptions appear to be when the tax at issue is

Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (suggesting without deciding that a denial of a charitable contribution deduction for a payment to a church may not place a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion).
158. See, e.g., Dessingue, supra note 139, at 177-78; Moore, supra note 155, at 309-11.
159. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
160. Id. at 885.
161. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
162. Id. at 258-59; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S.
378, 392 (1990) (concluding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require a state to
grant an exemption to a religious organization from the collection and payment of a
generally applicable sales tax); Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700 (citing Lee in rejecting a
free exercise challenge to the disallowance of a charitable contribution deduction for
certain payments to a church); Thomas, supra note 56, at 612-13 (discussing Lee).
163. See supra Part I.A.
164. E.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142-44 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1972); see also
Schwarz, supra note 43, at 73-80 (discussing Christian Echoes Nat'/ Ministry).
165. E.g., Parker v. Comm'r, 365 F.2d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 1966); Church of Scientology
v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 381, 458-60 (1984), affd 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
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effectively a prior restraint on religious activity, 166 intentionally targets disfavored religious practices, 167 or is so draconian as to have a
prohibitory effect. 168
The position that the courts have taken with respect to Free Exercise Clause claims relating to taxation is the correct one, regardless
of whether that conclusion is reached using the reasoning in Employment Division v. Smith or a strict scrutiny analysis. Even assuming that taxation by itself imposes a substantial burden on religious
exercise-which is debatable-the imposition of generally applicable tax laws in a neutral manner to churches is narrowly tailored to
further the government's compelling interest in collecting sufficient
revenue in an efficient and uniform manner. Merely invoking the
famous quotation that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy" is not enough to counter this argument if the tax law at issue
is reasonable in amount and generally applicable; as the quoted
source goes on to correctly state, "Taxation ... does not necessarily
and unavoidably destroy." 169
2.

Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause's application is trickier, in part because
it can reasonably be invoked to both support and oppose tax benefits for churches. Some commentators argue that since the Establishment Clause prohibits governments not only from favoring particular faiths but also from favoring religion generally over nonreligion, providing tax benefits to religious organizations is unconstitutional.170 Some argue instead or in addition that such exemptions raise significant entanglement concerns, including those
caused by having to determine what constitutes a "religion" or a

166. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389; Dessingue, supra note 139, at 17778.
167. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,546 (1993).
168. See Kenneth C. Halcom, Taxing God, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 729, 751-52 (2007).
169. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,431 (1819); see also Halcom, supra note 168,
at 749 (making this same point).
170. See, e.g., Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 600 (1990).
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"church," that render them unconstitutional. 171 In their view the
benefits provided to churches only are even more vulnerable to an
Establishment Clause challenge because they are not available to
any other tax-exempt nonprofits. 172
Supporters of the tax benefits for churches have in tum argued
that the Establishment Clause requires those benefits because otherwise the government would become excessively entangled in the
internal affairs of churches. 173 Their case is strongest in the income
tax exemption context, where determining the taxable income of a
church would require difficult decisions on both the income side for example, are donations to a church excluded from gross income
as "gifts" in all situations, or only when they are not motivated
(compelled?) by a perceived religious obligation-and the deduction side-for example, normally only expenses incurred to generate income are deductible, so it is unclear what expenses incurred
by a church would be deductible other than fundraising costs and
investment fees. 174 Other tax contexts raise less significant entanglement concerns because, for example, the application of sales and
use tax to purchases or sales by a church requires little involvement
in the church's internal affairs; while property taxes could raise difficult valuation issues for church buildings, 175 such taxes again do
not require much if any involvement in a church's internal affairs.
At the same time, exemptions and other tax benefits are not free
from entanglement concerns, in large part because of the need to
determine which organizations qualify for the tax benefit at issue.
171. See, e.g., Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the
Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 855, 900-01 (1993); Shortt, supra note 148, at 146, 182, 185. But see Erika King, Tax
Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 1010-14 (1999) (rejecting this argument).
172. See, e.g., Shaller, supra note 148, at 360-61; West, supra note 170, at 610.
173. See, e.g., Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal
Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 112-13 (1991);
Thomas, supra note 56, at 627-30.
174. See Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 12981300 (1969).
175. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363,410 (1991).
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The courts have walked a careful line in this area. In Walz v. Tax
Commission, 176 the Supreme Court determined that when a tax benefit is generally available to a broad range of organizations, including but not limited to churches and other religious organizations,
and so not intended to advance religion specifically, and also does
not have the effect of excessively entangling government with religion, then it is permissible under the Establishment Clause. 177 While
that decision concerned a property tax exemption, commentators
and lower courts have generally seen its reasoning as applying in
other tax contexts, including income taxes.178 At the same time, in
one instance when a tax benefit was made available only with respect to a religious activity, the Supreme Court found that the benefit violated the Establishment Clause by favoring religious activity
over non-religious activity. 179 Relying on the latter case, a federal
district court recently found the federal income tax exemption for
cash payments used for ministerial housing violated the Establishment Clause, although an appellate court reversed that decision. 180
The plaintiffs did not seek Supreme Court review, 181 so it is still possible, although unlikely, that the Supreme Court might conclude
this tax benefit is unconstitutional in a future case. If that were to
occur, there likely would be other successful Establishment Clause
challenges to church and minister-specific tax benefits.
Professor Edward Zelinsky has comprehensively considered
these Establishment Clause issues in a book-length analysis that we

176. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
177. Id. at 672-73, 675-76 (1970).
178. See generally King, supra note 171.
179. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion),
28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
180. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017), rev'd, 919
F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019). In the interests of full disclosure, on appeal one of the authors
signed an amicus curiae brief in this case arguing that this tax benefit does not violate
the Establishment Clause.
181. Atheists Give up $1B Church Tax Lawsuit, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIG. LIB.,
https://www.becketlaw.org/media/atheists-give-lb-church-tax-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/75S7-K85R].
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will not attempt to replicate in detail here. 182 Suffice it to say that he
is correct that entanglement concerns arise both when generally applicable tax laws apply (which he calls "enforcement entanglement") and when churches are granted exemptions to such laws
(which he calls "borderline entanglement") and that therefore the
Establishment Clause does not render any such benefits unconstitutional.183 While some would go further than Professor Zelinsky
and argue that the Establishment Clause requires exemption from
at least federal and state income taxes in most situations, 184 there is
little indication that the courts are open to such an argument. 185 Under any conditions, accepting this extension is not necessary for resolving how Bob Jones University should apply to churches. Instead,
it is sufficient to conclude that such benefits are constitutionally
permissible, as the Supreme Court held with respect to the property
tax exemption at issue in Walz. 186
C.

Policy Reasons for Tax Benefits

The existence of these many tax benefits naturally raises the question of why churches should receive them if they are not constitutionally required. Governments, academics, and others have provided numerous justifications for these benefits. 187 Critics of these
benefits have also marshalled arguments for why churches should
not enjoy them, whether in part or in whole. 188 This Part considers
the historical but no longer applicable reasons, the commonly asserted quid pro quo rationale, and finally an autonomy or "soft sovereignty" approach, which we adopt.

182. See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH: RELIGION, EXEMPTIONS, ENTANGLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2017).
183. See id. at xv, xvii.
184. See, e.g., Halcom, supra note 168, at 756, 760-62, 765-66.
185. See ZELINSKY, supra note 182, at 23.
186. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
187. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The "Independent" Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the
Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 49, 64-69 (2012) (summarizing justifications);
McCormack, supra note 67, at 984-989 (same).
188. See infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
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Historical Reasons: Hard Sovereignty or
Arm of the State
1.

Churches (and often their leaders) have enjoyed tax exemptions
and other tax benefits for thousands of years. 189 One possible reason
for the earliest examples is what could fairly be characterized as a
"strong sovereignty" justification - churches and their leaders are
not answerable to the state, but to a separate (and powerful) sovereign (whether God or gods), and so should not be subject to tax by
the state. 190 At a more practical level, this justification may be related to the fact that religious institutions and their leaders often
constituted a separate source of significant political power that
could and would resist, likely successfully and perhaps violently,
any attempts by the state to tax them. 191 However, this justification
no longer holds sway either at the theoretical or the practical level
in the United States, where the federal and state governments are
now the only legally recognized sovereigns192 (other than Native
American tribes in some respects 193 ).
A more well documented historical reason for providing tax benefits to some but not all churches is when the state has established
a state church. 194 In that situation, tax benefits are justified because
the state church is an arm of the government and so, like government agencies, is not subject to taxation. 195 In the past this also often

189. See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 139, at 71 n.1; John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 52231 (1991).
190. See, e.g., Halcom, supra note 168, at 736-37.
191. See, e.g., King, supra note 191, at 973-75.
192. Halcom, supra note 168, at 748; Thomas, supra note 56, at 610-11. See also MARC
0. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 191-93 (2013) (aspects of religious establishment continued in the United States until at least the 1940s).
193. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW§§ 4.01--4.07 (2012 ed.).
194. Halcom, supra note 168, at 737.
195. See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 139, at 75-76; WILLIAM GEORGE TORPEY,
JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 171 (1948); Halcom, supra note
168, at 737; Witte, supra note 175, at 374-75; Carl Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American
Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REV. 646, 648 (1915); Christine Roemhildt Moore, Note,
Religious Tax Exemption and the Charitable Scrutiny Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 29899 (2002).
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meant that churches from other faiths enjoyed only the tax benefits
available to charitable entities but not those limited to the established state church, but over time governments have usually extended the tax benefits the state religion historically enjoyed to
other faiths. 196 Often governments may have done so out of a vague
idea of fairness or in the face of political pressure without much
apparent consideration of why these benefits should extend to private entities that are not arms of the state. 197 Of course, the United
States has never had a national church and the states that did have
a state church no longer do, so this arm of the state justification also
no longer applies. 198
2.

Quid Pro Quo

Given that neither a strong sovereignty nor an arm of the state
justification applies in the United States, the most commonly cited
modem justification is a quid pro quo one. 199 Applied not only to
churches but to all 501(c)(3)s, this justification is essentially that the
societal benefits provided by these organizations, including but not
limited to the provision of services that governments would otherwise provide, exceed the societal costs of the tax benefits they enjoy .200 More sophisticated versions of this argument include economic theories that assert certain societally beneficial goods and
196. See Witte, supra note 175, at 379-80.
197. See id. Indeed, according to Professor John Witte, the disappearance of state
churches in the United States led to the first significant criticism of tax exemptions for
churches in the 1810s. Witte, supra note 175, at 381.
198. See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 192, at 191; King, supra note 191, at 977-78; Shortt,
supra note 148, at 161-62; Zollman, supra note 195, at 648-49.
199. See, e.g., EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 246
(1974); TORPEY, supra note 195, at 172; Zollman, supra note 195, at 64647; Dessingue,
supra note 139, at 174-75; Halcom, supra note 168, at 740; King, supra note 191, at 981;
Witte, supra note 175, at 387. This rationale is not purely modem, however, as it can be
traced back to at least the English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601. See CRIMM &
WINER, supra note 139, at 76-77; Halcom, supra note 168, at 738; Witte, supra note 175,
at375-76.
200. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 55; Moore, supra note 195, at 296-97; see also
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589-92 (1983) (arguing that charitable
exemptions are justified by the public benefit provided by the exempt entity). But see
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397U.S. 664,674 (1970) ("We find it unnecessary to justify the tax
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services would be provided at a suboptimal level absent the support provided to 501(c)(3)s through these tax benefits201 and political science theories that emphasize the pluralism benefits created
through this support of 501(c)(3)s. 202 Although a separate set of
modem theories relies on "tax base" arguments that the net income
(or property, or sales by, or purchases by) of either churches specifically or charities generally is not part of the base of the tax under
consideration when properly theorized, these theories are less favored, have acknowledged gaps, and perhaps most importantly,
have not had any traction with the courts. 203
One potential difficulty with this quid pro quo justification as applied to churches is that some commentators contest whether and
to what extent churches provide societal benefits, both generally
and in specific instances. 204 The severest critics of tax benefits for
churches usually view the societal benefits they provide as minimal
or nonexistent, dismissing most churches as no more than social
clubs for their members. 205 While even these critics acknowledge
that some churches provide beneficial services, such as soup kitchens or homeless shelters, their view is that these activities could and
exemption on the social welfare services or 'good works' that some churches perform
for parishioners and others.").
201. See generally John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK
267, 274-75 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
202. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56; Terry L. Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar: Defining "Religion" for Purposes of Administering Religious-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219,249 (1983); Moore, supra note 195, at 297; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at
689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the unique contribution of religious organizations to pluralism).
203. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,544 (1983)
(stating that, in case involving whether a nonprofit qualified for tax benefits, "[b]oth
tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy"); Bittker, supra note 174, at
1288-92 (applying these tax base theories to churches); Mayer, supra note 187, at 64-65
(summarizing these theories and their flaws); Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56-57 (applying these theories to churches and identifying issues when doing so).
204. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 55.
205. See, e.g., Miranda Fleischer, Churches Are More Private Club than Public Good. Why
Do They Need Tax Exemptions?, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/17/churches-are-more-club-than-publicgood-why-do-they-need-tax-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/9MY 6-MKZC].
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should be required to be spun off into separate legal entities to enjoy their justified tax benefits, while stripping those benefits from
churches. 206
Supporters of tax benefits for churches that rely on this justification have a very different view of the effect of churches on society.
They argue that churches, at least in the aggregate, provide numerous benefits to society. 207 These benefits include not only concrete
goods and services such as feeding the poor but also more difficult
to measure but no less real benefits, such as moral instruction, cultivation of public spiritedness, and fostering of democratic principles. 208 And these benefits redound not only to individuals involved with churches but society more generally. 209
3.

Autonomy (or Soft Sovereignty)

Professor Evelyn Brody has identified, but not endorsed, a "soft
sovereignty" approach that may explain in large part the tax exemptions enjoyed by charities, based on the notion that taxation of
at least some types of private organizations should be limited out
of recognition that there are spheres of society that should be
mostly beyond the state's authority. 210 Focusing on churches specifically, adopting this approach leads to a right of churches to enjoy

206. See, e.g., Mark Oppenheimer, Now's the Time To End Tax Exemptions For Religions
Institutions, TIME Gune 28, 2015, 11:16 AM), https://tirne.com/3939143/nows-the-tirneto-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/E64K-X3MT]; Editorial, Churches Should Pay Taxes!, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 9, 1947, reprinted in
THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY READER 327, 328 (Harold E. Fey & Margaret Frakes eds.,
1962).
207. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 1352-55; Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56 (summarizing this argument without endorsing it); Witte, supra note 175, at 387-88; Zollman,
supra note 195, at 647 (summarizing this argument without endorsing it). For arguments that religion is distinctive and so deserves special legal protection, see generally
KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTNENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (2015); Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special
Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 493-500 (2017).
208. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 1352-55; Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56 (summarizing this argument without endorsing it).
209. Witte, supra note 175, at 387.
210. Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 587-89 (1998); Legal Theories at 151-53; see also Mayer, supra note

194

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 44

autonomy in most situations, including with respect to finances. 211
Taxing churches risks violating this autonomy because it necessarily requires the state to become involved in the financial affairs
of churches, although the extent of that involvement will vary depending on the type of tax and the type of tax benefit involved.
This autonomy or soft sovereignty justification arises from the
view that, in any society where the state is not all encompassing,
there necessarily are areas that should be free from state oversight
and interference. 212 Churches have a particularly strong argument
for being such an area, at least with respect to their internal affairs. 213 That is because they provide an institutional setting for people who share a faith to practice that faith, to interact in ways designed to promote understanding and promulgation of that faith,
and to consider how their faith should affect their lives outside of
the church setting. 214 In other words, it is religiously significant activities that are protected, as Professor Laycock notes. 215 Any state
involvement with the internal affairs of churches risks disrupting
these important, private activities, particularly given both the
power of the state and the fact that the state's views will almost
certainly conflict with at least some of the teachings of most
faiths. 216 Some commentators also find a legal basis for this justification in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 217 The next
203, at 70-71 (proposing an autonomy perspective for evaluating the legal rules relating
to charities).
211. E.g., Brunson & Herzig, supra note 33, at 1202--03; Martin, supra note 156, at 309;
see also IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
43-44 (2014) (describing the broader debate over church autonomy).
212. See Brody, supra note 210, at 588.
213. Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 253, 267
(2009).
214. See Lund, supra note 207, at 490-91.
215. Laycock, supra note 213, at 267--68; see also DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES
SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 41 (1977) (characterizing churches as "the central repositories
of religious activity, from which may flow many kinds of partial or peripheral religious
interests or ministrations").
216. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 1341--43.
217. See Richard W. Garnett, Why churches shouldn't have to pay taxes, U.S. CATHOLIC
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.uscatholic.org/articles/201610/why-churches-shouldnthave-pay-taxes-30799 [https://perma.cc/XHQ8-47FQ]; supra Part III.B.
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Part therefore focuses on this approach, exploring the philosophical
and legal bases for it.
IV.

WHY THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT SHOULD CONTROL

The idea that the First Amendment-Religion Clauses included-protects institutions as well as individuals has gained
steam in recent years. 218 In regard to churches specifically, the "soft
sovereignty" approach described above lines up nicely with the
idea that churches, as First Amendment institutions, should be afforded autonomy regarding their internal doctrines and practices.
Under the First Amendment institutions theory, churches and other
institutions that participate in activities like speech and religion
should be afforded First Amendment protections as institutions.
This Part first provides a more in-depth treatment of the soft sovereignty approach in light of the philosophical idea of "sphere sovereignty" and then unites it with the legal idea of First Amendment
institutions and applies that understanding in the context of tax
benefits. This Part concludes by distinguishing and defining
churches-both as a theoretical underpinning and legal necessity.
A.

Sphere Sovereignty
1.

The Theory

The soft sovereignty approach is illuminated by the work of the
nineteenth-century neo-Calvinist writer and former Prime Minister
of the Netherlands Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper proposed that church
and state interact and coexist with each other according to his theory of sphere sovereignty. 219 Spheres are social institutions in which
"authority structures specific to those spheres emerge." 220 Sovereignty is the idea that spheres have a natural right to form both the

218. See infra Part IV.B.
219. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Abraham Kuyper on the Limited Authority of Church and
State, 7 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 105, 108--13 (2009).
220. Id. at 110.

196

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 44

sphere itself and the authority structure that governs it.221 Thus,
sphere sovereignty is the idea that certain social institutions should
enjoy a degree of autonomy within their own domains.
First, we must break down Kuyper's conception of a "sphere."
For Kuyper, the four main spheres are the State, Society, the
Church, and the Individual. 222 This Article focuses primarily on the
first three. Within society are social spheres, which encompass all
aspects of life and include "the family, the business, science, art and
so forth." 223 Thus, in this respect, a church can be thought of as a
social sphere, though there are important distinctions between the
two. 224 Kuyper describes the sphere-forming process for non-state
spheres as "organic." 225 People arrange themselves based on shared
interests or localities pursuant to natural forces of human nature. 226
Such arrangements are "natural" because forming them does not
require approval by a church, the state, or any other social sphere. 227
The state, conversely, is of a "mechanical" nature. 228 Unlike social
spheres, which are formed in a bottom-up fashion, states operate
from top-down. 229 Whereas daily activities occupy the spaces of social spheres, the state qua sphere is a "means of compelling order
and of guaranteeing a safe course of life." 230 Put simply, the state is
the "sphere of spheres, which encircles the whole extent of human
life." 231 The authority and responsibility inherent to each kind of
sphere-social versus state-flow from these differences. 232
221. Id.; see also ABRAHAM KUYPER, CALVINISM: SIX LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AT PRINCETON 121 (New York, Revell 1899) (" And in both these

spheres[, social and state,] the inherent authority is sovereign, that is to say, it has above
itself nothing but God.").
222. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 99, 139.
223. Id. at 116.
224. See infra Part IV.C.l.
225. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 115.
226. Id. at 116-17.
227. Id. at 110.
228. Id. at 116-17.
229. Id. at 115.
230. Id. at 101.
231. ABRAHAM KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, in ABRAHAM KUYPER: A CENTENNIAL
READER 461, 472 Games D. Bratt ed., 1998).
232. See Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 109-10.
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Second, we must understand what Kuyper meant by "sovereignty." In the organic development of social spheres, authority
structures emerge by which someone "either in his own person or
acting in the name of the institution ... issue[ s] directives to others
that place those others under the (prima fade) obligation to
obey." 233 Each sphere thus develops an authority structure specific
to its needs. 234 Besides the state itself, 235 spheres do not derive their
internal authority from anything or anyone outside of themselves,
but it is, rather, "original to them." 236 And importantly, this inherent ability of a sphere to define the parameters of its internal authority-that is, its "sovereignty" -is not only a descriptive account but a normative one: social spheres have a natural right to
organize and to govern themselves. 237 These concepts are not
unique to Kuyper; for example, Professor Victor Muiiiz-Fraticelli's
conception of sovereignty provides an independent source of legitimacy for institutions based on the concurrence of their members
and allows institutions to pursue their collective values without
first obtaining permission from another authority. 238
Kuyper' s approach to sovereignty also requires consideration of
the authority a sphere-be it a social sphere or the state-has over
other spheres. Because a sphere's sovereignty is natural to it, each
institution represents a "truly sovereign sphere[], which may not
lightly be interfered with by any other sovereign." 239 Kuyper' s focus on autonomy is not only a recognition that spheres are free to
organize self-governing structures, but also that they are free from
outside interference in their development and self-determination. 240
233. Id. at 109.
234. Id. at 109-10.
235. See KUYPER, supra note 231, at 110-16 (positing that states derive their political

authority not from the consent of the governed but from the grace of God).
236. Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 110.
237. Id.; see also KUYPER, supra note 221.
238. VICTOR MUNIZ-FRATICELLI, THE STRUCTURE OF PLURALISM 101-17 (2014).
239. Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 96 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
240. See Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 112 ("Kuyper thought that in a modem well-

functioning society, the authority of an organization should be limited to activities
within one particular sphere .... For when an institution comes under the control of
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Unlike social spheres, which must abide by this "principle of noninterference," the state has a unique role to play as the sphere of
spheres. 241 Negatively, the state "may never become an octopus,
which stifles the whole of life" but must "honour and maintain
every form of life, which grows independently, in its own sacred
autonomy." 242 But Kuyper also envisioned a positive role for the
state. The state has the:
right and duty: l. Whenever different spheres clash, to
compel mutual regard for the boundary-lines of each; 2.
To defend individuals and the weak ones, in those
spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest; and 3. To
coerce all together to bear personal and financial burdens
for the maintenance of the natural unity of the State. 243

When it governs within these guidelines, the state acts in accord
with-but does not exceed the scope of-its sphere sovereignty. 244
But when the state uses its coercive power to control social spheres
without their invitation -be it through restrictive regulations or
unequal treatment of similarly situated social spheres-the state exceeds the scope of its sphere sovereignty. 245
Kuyper envisioned a different role for the social sphere most relevant here: the church. Kuyper taught that, consistent with his theory, no single church should dominate, and, like the state, churches
cannot intrude outside of their own spheres. 246 The latter point implies not only that churches "must stay within their own province,"
but that a church cannot compel membership of persons who

an institution whose guiding function lies in another sphere, activity within the former
institution is almost always distorted by this 'outside' control."). See generally Richard
W. Garnett, The Worms and the Octopus: Religious Freedom, Pluralism, and Conservatism,
in AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: NOMOS LVI 160 (Sanford V. Levinson et al. eds., 2016)
(developing this idea).
241. See Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 114.
242. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 124.
243.Id. at124-25.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 97.
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would voluntarily disassociate with said church. 247 Positively, a
strong church sphere in society acts as a fundamental limit on
state-aggrandizement. 11248 Because churches recognize that their autonomy is ultimately given by God, they are distinguished from
other social spheres and, due to their unique metaphysical perspective, are particularly important for the organic development of a
thriving, pluralist society. 249
The church-state relationship that Kuyper imagined grows out of
the autonomy inherent to each sphere as well as the respective role
that each is to play. Describing Kuyper' s theory as creating a society
of guided and divided pluralism," one scholar wrote:
II

II

It is guided in that each sphere has 'its own unique set of
functions and norms,' and all of them are expressions of
God's ultimate sovereignty. It is divided in that each
sphere, provided that it acts appropriately, is to remain
sovereign, untouchable by church, state, or other social
institutions. 250

In sum, sphere sovereignty respects the inherent autonomy of privately and independently organized peoples-that is, social
spheres. The state, itself a sphere, is tasked with ensuring that organically created spheres, including churches, continue to have opportunities to emerge and to flourish. The relationship between
church and state under the sphere sovereignty approach thus provides a helpful starting point by which to approach church-state
disputes. Moreover, Kuyper' s theory, with its skepticism of outside

Id. at 98.
Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 112.
See infra Part IV.C.
Horwitz, supra note 239, at 98 (quoting Richard J. Mouw, Some Reflections on
Sphere Sovereignty, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PuBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 100 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 2000)).
247.
248.
249.
250.
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interference, fits with an American society in which liberty is regarded as a most cherished right. 251 It also resonates with the Catholic principle of subsidiarity. 252
Prior to discussion of the implications of the sphere sovereignty
approach for the special tax treatment of churches, we must address
the following objection: For the non-Christian, does it matter that
Kuyper was not only a devout Calvinist but that his theory of the
social structure is explicitly based on Christian ideas? In his application of Kuyper' s work to First Amendment institutions, 253 Professor Paul Horwitz squarely addresses this concern, and his replies
are also relevant in employing sphere sovereignty as a justification
for the tax benefits received by churches. Kuyper' s theory, while
unabashedly Calvinist, need not be tied to Calvinism or any religious belief system to retain its coherence and internal consistency .254 In fact, scholars who endorse sphere sovereignty have
argued that sphere sovereignty, even set loose from its Calvinist
roots, "has much to offer to contemporary discussions of civil society."255 For Professor Horwitz, this modernization of sphere sovereignty also quells concerns regarding the opposite objection-that

251. See The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."); Charles L. Cohen, The "Liberty or Death" Speech: A Note on Religion
and Revolutionary Rhetoric, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 702 (1981) (giving an historical account
of Patrick Henry's famous "Give me liberty, or give me death!" speech); see also Charles
Glenn, CPJ's 2017 Kuyper Lecture, Rediscovering Sphere Sovereignty In The Age of
Trump
(Apr.
27,
2017),
https://www.cpjustice.org/public/page/content/2017_kuyper_lecture_remarks [https://perma.cc/PNX2-CFM7).
252. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court Justices: A Theological Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296, 304-06 (2006); Horwitz, supra note 239, at 105;
PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE
OF THE CHURCH 'l['l[ 185-88 (2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifica1_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dottsoc_en.html [https://perma.ccN6CP-VWGQ] (the principle of subsidiarity).
253. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 91-99.
254. See id. at 93-94.
255. Richard J. Mouw, Culture, Church, and Civil Society: Kuyper for a New Century, 28
PRINCETON SEMINARY BULL. 48, 55 (2007); see also Horwitz, supra note 239, at 93-94;
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to separate sphere sovereignty from Calvinism robs the theory of
its force. 256 Rather than break down each aspect of Kuyper's theory
and test its secular strength, this Article simply does not rely upon
those aspects of sphere sovereignty that are uniquely Calvinist (and
has not thus far). Thus, sphere sovereignty remains a helpful theoretical framework for thinking about the relationship between
church and state in a modem, pluralist society. 257
However, because Kuyper is not king, the interplay between his
theory and the effects that it has had on American legal thought are
useful considerations before applying his metaphor in the modem
tax benefits context. 258 Some of the Founders-Thomas Jefferson,
John Adams, and James Madison among them-were influenced
by the early settlers' Puritan views on the roles of the state and
churches within society, views that parallel Kuyper's later work. 259
The Calvinist doctrine of covenant gave rise to the Puritan belief
that church and state were "two separate covenantal associations,
two coordinate seats of godly authority and power in society." 260
Inspired by this Puritan-influenced approach to pluralism, in his
drafting of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, John Adams
"guaranteed churches the right to select their own ministers without state interference, a right that is consistent with the concept of

Johan D. Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious Institutions: A Contemporary Calvinistic Theory Of Church-State Relations, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001).
256. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 93-94. See generally Mark Tushnet, Distinctively Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1858 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (2001)) (discussing in general the application of
"Christian" ideas to secular legal debates). But see George Harinck, A Historian's Comment on the Use of Abraham Kuyper's Idea of Sphere Sovereignty, 5 J. MARKETS & MORALITY
277 (2002) (arguing that sphere sovereignty is a credo that cannot be separated from its
religious roots).
257. See Horwitz, supra note 239, at 93-94.
258. For a deeper discussion of the effects of sphere sovereignty on the American
constitutional structure, see generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 179-82 (2013).
259. Horwitz, supra note 239 at 100-01.
260. JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 309 (2007).
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sphere sovereignty." 261 The early constitutions of Connecticut,
Maine, and New Hampshire had similar provisions. 262
Moreover, Professor Philip Hamburger observes that even late
eighteenth-century Americans who supported religious exemptions would not have argued for a constitutional right to exemptions because, at the time, "the jurisdiction of civil government and
the authority of religion were frequently considered distinguishable."263 No exemptions were necessary since "Congress shall make
no law" 264 infringing upon the free exercise of religion, which "assumes Congress can avoid enacting laws that prohibit free exercise" in the first place. 265 Likewise, Alexis de Tocqueville's description of the nineteenth-century interaction between church and state
in America was one that tracks the normative account later proffered by Kuyper. 266 Professor Horwitz notes that "Tocqueville saw
evidence in nineteenth-century America that the Calvinist Puritan
ideal had taken root: in Kuyper' s words, America had embraced a
pluralistic system whose watchword was '[a] free Church in a free
State."' 267 These historical examples, as well as later philosophical
trends that likewise track sphere sovereignty, lead Professor Horwitz to conclude that there is at least "the possibility that the ideas
underlying sphere sovereignty are not alien but immanent in the
American social and constitutional order." 268 As such, Professor
Horwitz concludes that real consideration ought to be given to
"how sphere sovereignty might be said to shape that order" and
how it might affect First Amendment issues. 269
We do not mean to overstate the influence that Kuyper's theory
of sphere sovereignty had on the American Founding, nor do we
261. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 102.
262. See id.
263. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 936-37 (1992).
264. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
265. Hamburger, supra note 263, at 938.
266. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 103.
267. Id. at 103 (quoting KUYPER, supra note 221, at 128).
268. Id. at 107.
269. Id.
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mean to claim that it has extensive ongoing political influence. Indeed, Professor Horwitz makes a humble claim: it is possible that
sphere-sovereignty-inspired thought influenced developments in
American religious liberty law. 270 Regardless, sphere sovereignty as
both a descriptive and normative concept is a useful tool for thinking about current and future First Amendment conflicts and provides at least a framework for explaining and justifying the unique
place in society that churches occupy. At its simplest, sphere sovereignty is a way of illustrating the idea that churches "should generally be treated as sovereign, or autonomous, within their individual
spheres [and should] coexist alongside the state ... serving a vital
role in furthering self-fulfillment, the development of a religious
community, and the development of public discourse." 271 Sphere
sovereignty therefore paints a specific picture and fills in some of
the philosophical gaps as to how such a pluralistic society ought to
operate. This Part, while it treats sphere sovereignty as a serious
theory, recognizes that it is not constitutionalized by the First
Amendment but serves as a theoretical framework for illustrating
the relationship between church and state in America so as to further explain the tax benefits that churches receive.
2.

Possible Objections

Some scholars nonetheless reject the use of this sphere sovereignty approach to justify the (legal) autonomy of churches. In one
of the more extensive critiques of church autonomy and religious
institutionalism, Professors Richard Schragger and Micah
Schwartzman make essentially four claims: (1) that the historical
account of religious liberty that supports church autonomy is inaccurate; (2) that church autonomy is anti-republican; (3) that church
autonomy justifications have no limiting principles; and (4) that
churches cannot be distinguished from secular groups. 272 As this
Part details, their anti-republican and lack of limiting principles
270. See id. at 105.
271. Id. at 114.
272. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99
VA. L. REV. 917, 932 (2013).
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charges are unpersuasive on their own terms. We will address their
church non-distinguishability argument in a later Part. 273 Finally,
their historical argument is largely levied against those who defend
modem-day church autonomy based on certain eleventh century
church-state events, 274 which we do not rely on.
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman argue that church sovereignty is anti-republican because "[i]nstitutions that purport to
play a special or outsized role in society should be democratically
accountable. The exercise of public power, of territoriality, of jurisdiction, demands democracy." 275 And because churches are not
democratically accountable, they have instead justified exercises of
sovereignty by expanding Thomas Paine's "church of one" in an
attempt to "infuse the institutional church with all the moral authority and independence of the autonomous self." 276 Churches
must therefore justify their authority in terms of conscience, not
sovereignty, because "mediating institutions no longer exercise
government power ... [which is] a product of republican political
theory."277
They also make a related argument that the public-private distinction upon which sphere theorists rely is untenable for churches
to support in light of their inability to distinguish themselves from
non-religious private institutions. 278 Where the liberal distinction
between state and individual collapses as churches are afforded
sovereignty, which, in their view, is ultimately founded upon the
individual right of conscience, the public-private distinction must
be replaced with something else to maintain the view that churches
occupy a unique sphere of sovereignty. Thus, they argue, churches
fall back on the church-state distinction-but "determining what is
a church is no more tractable than determining what is a religion,
273. See infra Part IV.C. For an institutional critique of Professors Schragger and
Schwartzman's article, see Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA.
L. REV. 1049 (2013).
274. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 933--37.
275. Id. at 944.
276. Id. at 943.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 944.
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or what is private and what is public." 279 Because this argument
largely bleeds into their critique of the indistinguishability of
churches from secular groups, we address it in our later Part on that
issue. 280
Government power is distinct from sovereignty, however, and
no church situated within an otherwise democratic society would
have a valid claim to exercising the government's power. Church
autonomy stands for the proposition that-within its own spherethe church may exercise sovereign control. Insofar as "[r]epublicanism demands that the people ... constitute the sovereign," 281 some
churches are not republican - but such churches would not claim
to be so in the first place. The sovereignty of many churches is understood not to derive from the people but from a higher power.
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman further argue that republicanism "does not tolerate corporate entities[, including churches,]
that operate outside of and in defiance of the state." 282 As a matter
of liberal political theory, this assertion is far from settled. 283 But
even accepting the proposition as true, if "defiance of the state"
means violating-to borrow a constitutional term-a "neutral law
of general applicability," 284 then the soft sovereignty approach we
advance here accommodates that restriction insofar as the law is
criminal in nature. 285 The government is without authority, however, to act beyond its own laws-that is, to exceed its sovereign
sphere-in controlling the beliefs or practices of churches.

279. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 944.
280. See infra Part IV.C.
281. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 943.
282. ld.
283. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 63 (1999) (arguing that liberal, democratic
societies must treat as equals "decent hierarchical peoples," that is, nondemocratic societies that respect basic human rights, even if its members are not guaranteed freedom
and equality).
284. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
285. See infra Part V.C.
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Moreover, if Professors Schragger and Schwartzman mean to
suggest that churches themselves ought to abide by a democratically elected hierarchy to gamer secular approval, that position
seems to run counter to their central claim that individual "rights
of conscience are doing all the relevant [legal] work." 286 Democracy
is valued not simply because it is politically desirable but because
that political desirability necessarily stems from the robust protection of individual liberties that democracies champion, rights of
conscience and association chief among them. If members of a democratic society wish to arrange their religious institutions in a patently undemocratic manner, what right does a democratic government have to interfere with this conscious choice? This argument
would also prove too much: if churches cannot arrange their affairs
in an undemocratic manner, and if, as Professors Schragger and
Schwartzman contend, churches are indistinguishable from secular
groups, could any groups within a democracy be undemocratically
structured? It would seem that universities, privately held corporations, and, taken to its logical extreme, the nuclear family, would
potentially be disallowed under their expansive distrust of undemocratic institutions.
But the fear of vast, undemocratically accountable exercises of
church sovereignty is further quelled in light of responses to their
jurisdictional critique. Professors Schragger and Schwartzman are
principally worried about the scope of a church's sphere sovereignty. They ask, "What is the appropriate sphere of church sovereignty if the mission of the church is to save mankind? ... The
strong form of sphere sovereignty claims that churches have a special, unique, and exclusive mission to preach the Word, to convert
the unconverted, and to glorify God." 287 Kuyper would likely agree
with this classification. 288 So are there limiting principles?
We wish here to reemphasize our original claim: that church
autonomy is justified under a soft sovereignty approach. While

286. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 969.
287. Id. at 946.
288. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 135.
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Kuyper would have rejected the "hard sovereignty" approach, 289
his "strong form of sphere sovereignty" risks a potentially overbroad application, as Professors Schragger and Schwartzman suggest.290 But limiting the scope of the church's "sphere" -at least as
an abstract matter-is possible, and we recognize that it's a practical necessity if church autonomy is to be legally recognized. 291
Even under Kuyper' s theory, the church is not all-encompassing; the state, not the church, is the sphere of spheres. Thus, while
escaping state membership is impossible, the state actually plays an
important role in ensuring that, within its jurisdiction, those who
wish to join a church may do so, and those who wish to leave a
church may also do so. 292 This understanding comports with
Kuyper's posited "sovereignty of the individual person." 293 Indeed,
the state's "right and duty ... [t]o defend individuals and the weak
ones, in those spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest" 294
would be hollow if it could not cabin the church's exercise of its
sphere sovereignty to governing its members.
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman respond that "because
the institution of the church is the church for all, and because saving
souls is central to its mission, the church's jurisdiction can and must
be extended to all .... [Indeed], Christianity and Islam are explicit
about their claims to universality." 295 But this critique misses the
point. Just because some churches believe they have sovereign jurisdiction over all of mankind does not confer to them such jurisdiction given the state's dictates under the sphere sovereignty approach. A Christian may try to convert nonbelievers to the faith, but
until the nonbeliever himself chooses Christianity, no Christian
church may claim sovereign authority over him. 296 Kuyper thought

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See id.
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 946.
See infra Part V.C.
See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
KUYPER, supra note 221, at 139.
Id. at 124.
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 947.
See id. at 957-62.
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that all nations should be Christian. 297 But even he understood that
worldwide Christian rule could "never be realized except through
the subjective convictions of those in authority, according to their
personal views of the demands of that Christian principle." 298 If
leaders of nation states were not rightfully subjected to the jurisdiction of the church until they themselves converted, it must be true
that laymen are afforded this same personal autonomy of choice,
with the state serving as the enforcer of the various spheres' boundaries. Therefore, it is possible to limit a church's grandiose exercise
of its sovereignty to its own sphere.
Nothing in the preceding paragraphs should be taken to suggest that churches must forfeit their right to persuade others to join
their faith in the public square. Just as secular social spheres may
try to increase their membership, so too may churches. The preceding discussion stands for the principle that unless and until a person decides to join a church, that church has no sovereign authority
over that person because that person is rightfully outside of the
church's sphere and thus its sovereign control. A church's conception of what constitutes its sphere-for example, the Christian belief that all human persons are children of God 299 - and the exercise
of sovereignty within that sphere may not always line up. Such differences are reconcilable given a state that, "[w]henever different
spheres clash[,] ... compel[s] mutual regard for the boundary-lines
of each." 300
Thus, we agree with Professors Schragger and Schwartzman
that voluntary church membership is a necessary condition for
churches to exercise authority under our soft sovereignty approach. 301 That certain religions might not view membership as voluntary has no bearing on how the state must treat those churches.
297. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 135.
298. Id.
299. Cf Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 946 ("[C]hurches often assert
that their jurisdiction extends to non-members of the institution. Indeed, it may be a
central doctrine of the church that it alone appropriately rules in all spiritual and temporal matters regardless of membership.").
300. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 124.
301. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 957.
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If a member in such a church cannot leave even though she wishes
to, the state has the rightful power-and in fact, duty-to ensure
the free flow of members between social spheres. 302 We further
agree that this voluntarism disallows the state from "assisting in
coercing non-members while requiring the state to enforce exit
rights," 303 but we disagree that voluntary church membership necessitates church autonomy based on conscience or associational
rights, as opposed to religious freedom. The soft sovereignty framework allows for sovereignty-based autonomy wherein sphere
members may join and leave sovereign spheres as they please. We
acknowledge that separating from a church is not always easy
given the "coercive" doctrines of certain churches and other internal pressures to stay. 304 The potential costs of leaving do not undermine that the choice of leaving is voluntary (or is at least viewed as
such by the government) in the first place. As long as it is possible
to leave-so ensured by the state's obligation and duty to protect
against abuses of sovereign power-the necessary condition of voluntary church membership is satisfied. 305 Soft° sovereignty is compatible with and is in fact premised upon voluntarism (which is
also consistent with Kuyper' s treatment of individuals as another
separate sphere). 306
3.
efits

Sphere Sovereignty, Churches, and Tax Ben-

The tax exemption and charitable contribution deduction enjoyed
by churches are justified in light of the above sphere sovereignty
framework. The United States, along with state and local governments, constitutes the sphere of spheres as the state, while churches
are one of a plethora of social spheres within Am~rican society. 307
Both the United States and churches are spheres, so each must
302. See supra notes 239-243 and accompanying text.
303. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 960.
304. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 141-42.
305. See Schrager & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 960.
306. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 127 ("[T]he struggle for liberty is not only declared
permissible, but is made a duty for each individual in his own sphere.").
307. But see infra Part IV.C. (distinguishing churches).
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abide by the principle of noninterference essential to Kuyper' s approach.308 Recall that the state has three affirmative duties, the first
two of which require the state to keep peace among spheres and to
defend individuals within spheres "against the abuse of power,"
respectively. 309 It is from the third, "to coerce all together to bear
personal and financial burdens for the maintenance of the natural
unity of the State," that the state derives its legitimate power to levy
taxes. 310 But this power is checked by the first two duties in conformity with the principle of noninterference. 311 All spheres have
the natural right to exercise the inherent sovereignty "original to
them." 312 The argument we advance herein, based on the soft sovereignty theory articulated above, provides a philosophical basis
upon which the special tax treatment of churches can be explained
in light of Bob Jones University. We later offer a number of practical,
necessary line-drawing limitations to curb overzealous application
of the soft sovereignty approach in this context. 313
First, the tax exemption. As sphere of spheres, the United States
has an obligation to respect the inherent sovereignty of churches.
The state does this most obviously by affording churches the autonomy to manage their own property. 314 Any taxation levied upon
any entity necessarily entangles that entity with the state. When the
state does not tax an entity, it reduces entanglement, increasing the
autonomy afforded to that entity. Because churches are to be autonomous within their own spheres, the state ought not tax churches
because in so doing, it allows churches the fullest control over their
resources. Churches, as soft sovereigns, ought to be afforded the
autonomy to enjoy complete control over the allocation of their
property-money and otherwise-without the outside influence of
the state interfering with that control. Taxes necessarily infringe
upon this right. Therefore, if the state and churches truly are soft
308. See supra notes 240-242 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
310. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 124-25 (emphasis omitted).
311. Id. at 125.
312. Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 110.
313. See infra Part V.C.
314. See supra Part III.C.3.
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sovereigns within the sphere sovereignty framework, taxing
churches violates the autonomy inherent to them. Refraining from
taxing churches is also consistent with the state's duty to adhere to
the principle of noninterference. So while tax exemption is not necessarily constitutionally required for the reasons previously discussed, it is desirable as a policy matter. In addition, once tax exemption is granted, this soft sovereignty approach argues against
taking away that benefit for violating fundamental public policy.
Second, the charitable contribution deduction is also justified in
light of the sphere sovereignty approach. The United States respects the sovereignty of churches by allowing them to manage
their own property. 315 It follows that the United States must afford
church members this same autonomy, at least with respect to the
church members' property that is charitably given to a church. To
comply with the principle of noninterference in its treatment of
churches, while at the same time not extending similar treatment to
church members, is a contradiction in terms: What is a church- and
more broadly, a sphere-if not a collection of members? Respecting
the autonomy of churches to manage their property thus necessitates the charitable contribution deduction. A church member may
rightly contend that his annual gift to his church is not first "his"
money that upon his donation becomes "the church's." Rather, the
donated money always belonged to the church. The member is
merely the medium by which that money is transferred from one
sphere, call it "the market," 316 to another, namely, "the church."
Once there, as was shown above, that money is rightfully free from
taxation. But for the charitable contribution deduction, property
that belongs to churches would, in effect, be taxed via the increased
tax base to which church members would be susceptible, increasing
their taxes owed to the state. 317 Consequently, churches would not

315. Id.
316. Of course, money that remains in the sphere we have labeled "the market,"
which ought to be defined extremely broadly, is susceptible to taxation under the third
duty of state spheres. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
317. This "tax base" argument differs from those disfavored in the text accompanying supra note 203. Above, the "tax base" in question is the church's income itself. But
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be afforded the sovereignty inherent to them but would instead be
subjugated to the coercive power of the state in contradiction of the
principle of noninterference. Of course, not all faiths teach that financial contributions to the church are obligatory, nor do all adherents of faiths that have such teachings necessarily agree with or follow them, 318 but it is reasonable to apply this policy to churches of
all faiths in order to avoid the difficult task of distinguishing among
them on this ground. And again, this is a policy, not constitutional,
argument that both supports providing the charitable contribution
for donations to churches and not taking away that benefit for violating fundamental public policy.
Moreover, the charitable contribution deduction is the government's way of fostering comity toward the church. Church members pay taxes, and the state leaves to the church its share through
the charitable contribution deduction. The availability of the standard deduction as a way of effectuating the charitable contribution
deduction does not undermine the philosophical basis upon which
the deduction is offered because the standard deduction exists not
to undermine the principles underlying itemized deductions but is
instead a practical choice by Congress to simplify tax collection. 319
By allowing church members to reduce their taxable income based
on money they donate to churches, through either an itemized or
standard deduction, the government not only acknowledges the
autonomy of churches to manage their own money, but it also recognizes that the sphere that is "the church" is composed of individuals whose allegiance to the church cannot be cause for their adverse treatment under the principle of noninterference. Without the
charitable contribution deduction, church members who give to
their churches would per se owe a higher percentage of their postcontribution income in taxes and would thus have less disposable
with the charitable contribution deduction addressed here, the "tax base" refers to a
private citizen's taxable income.
318. See David W. Case, Comment, Resolving the Conflict Between Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code and the Free Exercise Clause- In re Green: A Step in the Wrong Direction,
57 MISS. L.J. 163, 164-65 (1987).
319. Steve R. Johnson, Administrability-Based Tax Simplification, 4 NEV. L.J. 573, 58486 (2004).
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income than would those who do not donate to churches. Having
the "right and duty" to "compel mutual regard for the boundarylines of [different spheres]" and to "defend individuals ... against
the abuse of power," the state cannot rightfully allow such adverse
treatment between those who donate to churches and those who do
not.320
Furthermore, from an empirical standpoint, seventy-four percent
of churches' revenue comes from charitable contributions. 321 Economists predict that without the charitable contribution deduction,
charitable gifts to churches would decrease by just over twenty-two
percent, 322 which would have a major impact given that in 2017
American churches received over $127.37 billion in contributions. 323
This figure likely is lower now because of recent tax law changes
that will cause a substantial decrease in the proportion of households that itemize their deductions. 324 Nevertheless, the loss of eligibility to receive tax deductible contributions almost certainly
would still have a significant negative effect on giving to churches
since many high-income households can still take advantage of this
deduction. 325 Therefore, the United States as the sphere of spheres
has the power, via its taxation policies, to substantially affect
churches' budgets. To abide by the principle of noninterference,
and against the reality that donations to churches have been tax deductible for generations, the government should refrain from enacting policies that reduce the amount of funds available to
churches. Eradicating the charitable contribution deduction would
have this effect, a clear reduction of the degree of autonomy a

320. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 124-25.
321. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A
Two-Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS & GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION & CONFLICT 133,
137 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2011).
322. Id. at 138.
323. Thad S. Austin et al., Giving to Religion, in GIVING USA 2018: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2017, at 173 (2017).
324. See TAX POL'Y CTR., What are itemized deductions and who claims them?,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-itemized-deductions-andwho-claims-them [https://perma.cc/Z8QD-R3A7].
325. Id.
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church exercises over its resources. Consequently, if a church
taught that its members ought not pay taxes to the government, the
church itself would cease to abide by the principle of noninterference. Fair treatment among spheres-and especially fairness between the state and churches-runs in both directions.
B.

First Amendment Institutions

While the concept of sphere sovereignty provides a philosophical
basis for the proposed soft sovereignty approach in applying Bob
Jones University to churches, the First Amendment provides a legal
basis. About twenty years ago, dissatisfaction with the rules and
categories of First Amendment law gave rise to what has been
called the "institutional tum." 326 In the "pre-legal world," individuals are not the only actors. Activities, specifically those which
would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment, "happen[] ... through and by institutions." 327 This real-world observation inspired a fresh approach to First Amendment issues, one that
contends that institutions are morally relevant actors for the "definitions and distinctions drawn in First Amendment doctrine." 328
That is, under this First Amendment institution theory, the substantive guarantees of the First Amendment protect not only individuals but groups of organized individuals-namely, institutions. 329
To determine what constitutes a First Amendment institution,
Professor Horwitz proposes that two elements be satisfied: that the
institution plays a central role in public discourse, and possesses
self-regulatory norms and practices. 330 The former is not so broad
as to encompass any institution that contributes to public discourse
but is limited to those institutions that are "fundamental" to the
"infrastructure" of public discourse. 331 Thus, while other types of
326. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 74-75; Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 276-84
(2008).
327. Garnett, supra note 326, at 277.
328. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 74-75
329. Id.
330. Id. at 81.
331. Id. at 244.
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legal entities participate in public discourse, they are not essential
to its infrastructure in the way that newspapers, libraries, and universities are. 332 Additionally, institutions that are self-regulatingthose that "operate according to a rich set of norms, practices, and
rules" -satisfy the second prong of the First Amendment institution definition and ought to be legally recognized as such.333 This
two-prong definition serves as a helpful guide for characterizing
institutional actors for First Amendment purposes.
The above discussion on soft sovereignty supplies the theoretical
basis for affording First Amendment institutions some sovereign
control. 334 In short, the government ought to respect the autonomy
inherent to First Amendment institutions, as they are sovereign
within their own spheres. This soft sovereignty approach is not, as
was shown above, without its limits, and the government may still
restrict the conduct of such institutions, at least in some respects. 335
The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment remain, however,
necessary protections against an.over-intrusive state.
Building upon this institutional framework, many commentators
have argued that churches should be recognized as First Amendment institutions. 336 Applying Professor Horwitz's two-part test
renders churches First Amendment institutions, for they "are
surely well-established, self-governing institutions with a
longstanding infrastructural role in public discourse and a unique

332. See id.
333. Id. at 86.
334. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 93-96.
335. See infra Part V.C.
336. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 174-93; Garnett, supra note 326; Richard W.
Garnett, The Freedom of the Church: (Toward) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, in
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 39, 45 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds.,
2016); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373
(1981); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy Doctrine:
Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 460-61 (2011); cf Steven D.
Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church? (Univ. of San Diego Legal Stud. Rsch.
Paper Series, Paper No. 11-061, 2011) (arguing that the First Amendment Religion
Clauses are about collective religious practice), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412 [https://perma.cc/ZF6V-P4EN].
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set of contributions to make to it." 337 Moreover, the constitutional
text supports an institutional conception of churches under the First
Amendment. As Professor Richard Garnett argues, "An appreciation for the rights and independence of religious institutions, and
an account of the implications of these rights for the financial, regulatory, cooperative and other relations between religious and governmental institutions, is a crucial component of any attractive account of the Religion Clauses." 338
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly applied the institutional approach to churches in First Amendment challenges relating to taxes, it has assumed that religious institutions (and churches
specifically) enjoy First Amendment protections. 339 In Bob Jones University itself, the Court assumed that Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro Christian Schools-both religious schools- were protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 340 It ultimately concluded that
the government's compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education outweighed the religious schools' free exercise
rights. 341 But it nonetheless assumed that the First Amendment applied to the religious schools as such.342 And in church property dispute cases, the Court has unambiguously recognized the First
Amendment rights of churches. 343 The leap from these precedents
to affording First Amendment protections to churches in the tax
context-a subset of religious organizations-is a small one at best.
The next Part explores why this is the case.

337. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 176; see also id. at 244 ("Certain entities-churches,
newspapers, libraries, and so on-are clearly vital parts of that infrastructure [of public
discourse].").
338. Garnett, supra note 326, at 293.
339. See infra note 343.
340. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983).
341. Id. at 604.
342. See also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berm, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055
(2020) (applying the Religion Clauses to a religious school); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188--92 (2012) (same).
343. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448--52 (1969); Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952).
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Churches Distinguished

Theoretically, the soft sovereignty theory and First Amendment
institution framework could justify the special tax treatment of
many non-religious groups. In Bob Jones University, the Supreme
Court applied the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine
to non-church religious institutions over their First Amendment objections. Because we accept Bob Jones University as a given for purposes of this Article, it is necessary to determine whether churches
can and should be distinguished from non-churches when it comes
to applying this doctrine. This Part argues that defining what constitutes a "church" is philosophically possible and is legally both
possible and necessary.
Philosophical
Churches
1.

Basis

for

Distinguishing

Religious skeptics-Professors Schragger and Schwartzman
among them-argue that the soft sovereignty approach to churchstate relations proves too much, that the sphere sovereignty justification covers not only churches but could logically be extended to
encompass all social spheres, including religious schools or hospitals. 344 Moreover, why should the neighborhood fraternal organization or local small business not enjoy the same tax benefits that
churches do given the sphere sovereignty framework? And further,
if religious institutions can be distinguished from secular groups, is
it possible to further delineate between churches and other kinds of
religious organizations such as religious schools and hospitals?
Their main contention lies with the first question; once churches
can be distinguished from secular groups in theory, the law becomes the forum for the finer line-drawing required to answer the
second question. 345
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman' s objection does not take
up, as others have, the debate over whether religion is an inherent

344. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 946.
345. See id. at 956 n.166.
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good, nor do they attempt to empirically weigh the (secularly perceived) social good against the (secularly perceived) social harm
that churches promulgate. 346 Instead, they phrase and reject the
sphere-theorist's claim as follows: "The religious institutionalist ... has to claim not only that religion is good but that organized
religion facilitates, promotes, or is constitutive of that good." 347
Stated another way, the sphere-theorist's "instrumental
claim ... asserts that churches provide non-theologically-based
benefits to society. But this raises the question of whether churches
do so uniquely." 348 While we have slight reservations about the
characterization of what exactly sphere-theorists must prove, we
nonetheless engage in the debate as so framed.
In support of their argument, Professors Schragger and Schwartzman slightly mischaracterize Kuyper's theory. They note that
Kuyper taught that sovereign spheres included "the family, the
business, science, art and so forth." 349 But that litany does not preclude a distinct conception of the church-as-sphere; indeed, it is entirely silent on "the Church." 35°Kuyper scholar Professor Nicholas
Wolterstorff assures us that it is "unmistakably clear that [Kuyper]
regarded the church as fundamentally unique and regarded its autonomy under God as more fundamental than that of any other institution."351 A cursory glance at the presentment of his sphere theory shows that Kuyper was careful to maintain distinctions
between the State, Society, and the Church. 352
Kuyper' s main, albeit implicit, distinguishing factor is that
churches are necessarily rooted in religious truths, whereas nonreligious groups are not. 353 Churches, then, are social spheres that
adhere to and practice religion, and non-churches are social spheres

346. See id. at 950.
347. Id. at 949 (emphasis omitted).
348. Id. at 953.
349. Id. at 948 n.122 (citing KUYPER, supra note 221, at 90).
350. See id. at 948-49.
351. Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 116.
352. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 99, 127.
353. See id. at 128-30.
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that do not adhere to nor practice religion. 354 Professors Schragger
and Schwartzman do not look at the specific beliefs held by
churches or any social institution as a basis for distinguishing
among them, and they accordingly make two errors in not crediting
"religion" as a distinctive quality of churches. First, they assume
that churches justify their institutional autonomy on conscience or
associational rights-as opposed to collective doctrinal adherence-in setting the parameters of the church's sphere. Second,
they rely upon that assumption to group churches together with
other social institutions. But religious sphere theorists reject their
first assumption in favor of a church uniqueness based on "religiosity." If religion is unique to churches, and by all accounts it is,
then Professors Schragger and Schwartzman' s conclusion that
churches are indistinguishable from secular spheres fails.
Distinguishing churches from other social spheres on the basis of
religion is, however, only half the battle for the religious sphere theorist. The question still remains: Why does religion deserve special
treatment? That is, even if churches are distinguishable from secular spheres, what about the nature of religion requires that churches
receive favors from the state?355 The secularly perceived benefits of
a religious society are plentiful356 but contested. 357 In any matter, the
intangible benefits are ultimately what tip the scale in favor of a
governmental structure that recognizes the importance of preserving a religious populace.
While some would disagree, we would argue that religion as a
whole, albeit in its best form and in ways that vary among faiths, is
a conduit for social and moral good. So promulgated by churches,

354. See id.
355. This is the argument Professors Schragger and Schwartzman ultimately raise.
See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
356. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 950 n.131.
357. See id. at 950 n.130.
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religions teach their adherents principles, in both form and substance, that are unique among other social spheres.358 Religion promotes respect for authority, a necessary feature of a sustainable democracy.359 It fosters concern for one's community and for the poor,
and as one commentator put it, "Exclusive concern for self-interest
is the very definition of the corruption of republican virtue." 360 Religion occupies a unique space because "[c]hurches, as communities of spiritual discernment and moral reflection, can begin conversations about the common good within their own communities and
then reach out to include other persons and institutions." 361 Religious groups make the pursuit of supernatural and moral truths
their primary activity in a way that secular organizations simply do
not. And in a society in which rights are perceived as God-given, 362
religion plays a vital role in promoting the dignity of the human
person - a dignity that the law endeavors to recognize and protect. 363
2.

Legal Basis for Distinguishing Churches

But regardless of whether one accepts this philosophical argument, is there a legal basis for distinguishing churches from other
types of religious organizations? The Court itself suggested there
may be in carefully setting to the side whether its holding in Bob

358. See e.g., PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH (2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dottsoc_en.html [https://perma.cc/KQ7W-EDYF].
359. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 82-84 (1984).
360. Robert N. Bellah, Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic, Soe'Y,
May/June 1978, at 16, 20.
361. BRIAN STILTNER, RELIGION AND THE COMMON GOOD: CATHOLIC CONTRIBUTIONS
TO BUILDING COMMUNITY IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 124 (1999).
362. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness." (emphasis added)).
363. See id. ("That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... ").
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Jones University applied to "churches or other purely religious institutions."364 And while the Court in some decisions has extended religious liberty protections to non-church religious organizationsfor example, the ministerial exception cases both involved religious
schools365 -in others it appears to have limited those protections to
churches. 366 Finally, when a non-church religious organization provides secular services or goods such as education or health care in
a manner that is contrary to fundamental public policy, the government's interest in not supporting that organization through tax benefits is significantly stronger than in the church context. This is because, as the IRS has noted, provision of such services in a manner
strongly disfavored by the government can, for example in the case
of racial discrimination, "reasonably be expected to aggravate the
disparity in the educational, economic, or social levels of [a racial]
group when compared with society as a whole," 367 while a typical
church discriminating with respect to employment, religious services, or membership will likely not have such an effect.
Therefore, even if a religious or sphere sovereignty skeptic adheres to the conscience-based conception of church autonomy, rejects the idea of the church as a First Amendment institution, or
finds the above-proffered arguments for the distinctive treatment
of churches altogether unconvincing, the law has recognized that
churches can be distinguished and that churches, as religious organizations, ought to receive special treatment under the First
Amendment. This observation does not dismiss the justifications
364. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983).
365. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berm, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020);
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 174 (2012).
366. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (affirming the First Amendment
limitations on the role of civil courts to resolve church property disputes); Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (identifying churches as having a particular freedom from state interference as a matter of religious liberty); Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1871) (recognizing that decisions of church bodies are not reviewable by civil courts when based on internal church law); see also Ira Mark Ellman, Driven
from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378,
1403 (1981); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 57-58 (2002).
367. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mero. 89-10-001 (Mar. 10, 1989); see supra note 86.
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offered above, it merely acknowledges that the law recognizes the
uniqueness of churches, even if the underlying rationale for doing
so has not been systematically and consistently explained. In other
words, the American system has accepted the distinct space that
churches occupy given the First Amendment's Religion Clauses,
which themselves single out religion from other social spheres. 368
As a practical matter then, we consider some instances in which
courts have distinguished churches from non-churches so as to inform the line-drawing necessary to advance our position that Bob
Jones University should apply in a more limited fashion to churches.
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court was careful to reserve the
question of how the reasoning of Bob Jones University would apply
to "churches or other purely religious institutions." 369 While its basis for doing so could reasonably be viewed as the fact that the public policy at issue related to education and so only applied to
schools, there is another basis for distinguishing churches (and perhaps "other purely religious institutions," whatever exactly that
means) from religious schools, hospitals, and other types of entities.
That basis is the same one that underlies the ministerial exception
with respect to the employment of religious leaders (albeit an exception the Court has extended beyond churches), 370 the limited
role of civil courts in resolving church property disputes, 371 and the
autonomy or soft sovereignty justification for the tax benefits generally enjoyed by churches372 -that the internal affairs of churches
should generally not be subject to government interference because
of both free exercise and entanglement concerns under the First
Amendment.
In addition to the theoretical factors by which to distinguish
churches for tax benefit purposes, the Constitution itself offers
some distinguishing characteristics unique to the church setting.
368. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just)

Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515 (2007); Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 366.
369. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 594, 604 n.29 (1983).
370. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 975.
371. See supra note 366.
372. See supra Part III.C.3.
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For example, while the Supreme Court accepted the constitutionally based ministerial exception in the context of a religious school,
its reasoning applies even more strongly to churches. The Court designed the exception to prevent "government interference with an
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church itself." 373 The Court thus distinguished laws that incidentally burden outward expressions of religious conduct, such as
the ban on the ingestion of peyote that the Court upheld even as
applied to sacramental use in Employment Division v. Smith. 374 While
the ministerial exception cases are of course limited to the employment context, the reasoning in those cases mirrors that in cases involving internal church decisions that affect the faith and mission
of the church itself, such as the church property disputes for which
the Court has prohibited civil court involvement if they involve
church law or ecclesiastical disputes. 375 Such decisions would include, for example, those who may participate in religious activities
and in what role. 376 The soft sovereignty justification applies similarly to the tax context. If taxation would significantly interfere with
the internal affairs of a church, then this respect for soft sovereignty
should prevent such taxation. The key questions in both contexts
are what falls within a church's internal affairs and what limits may
be drawn.
The legal basis for the soft sovereignty justification is therefore
the First Amendment. In requiring churches to conform their internal affairs to fundamental public policy when doing so is contrary
to their religious beliefs, taxing churches for failure to comply with
such policy substantially burdens free exercise of religion and invites substantial entanglement, and so is not permissible constitutionally absent a compelling governmental reason to do so. If a
church engages in illegal activity, especially criminal activity, then
373. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190
(2012).
374. Id.
375. See supra note 366.
376. See Mikochik, supra note 95, at 205 (freedom of expressive association protected
by the First Amendment protects those "who could join in liturgy" even if, under Employment Division v. Smith, it does not encompass "what that liturgy could include").
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that would generally provide such a reason, but non-illegal activity
that conflicts with fundamental public policy generally does not.
D.

Defining "Church"

This Article thus far argues that employing a soft sovereignty interpretation of Bob Jones University applied to churches is appropriate on philosophical and legal grounds and leads to a more limited
application of that decision to churches than to charities. But what
exactly is a "church"? Both Kuyper and the Supreme Court hesitate
to allow the government to decide what constitutes a church.
Kuyper posits that it is the church's "privilege, and not that of the
State, to determine her own characteristics as the true Church, and
to proclaim her own confession, as the confession of the truth." 377
And the Court has echoed this view, steering clear of deciding cases
on the basis of "the faith and mission of the church itself." 378 But the
church, as one social sphere among many, albeit a privileged one
given the First Amendment, is not free to avoid all interactions with
the government, and the Court ought not balk at deciding difficult
First Amendment questions. For purposes of applying the fundamental public policy doctrine as we frame it, defining what exactly
constitutes a church becomes a necessary line-drawing problem
with which the courts must engage.
Which organizations should qualify as churches in the tax benefit
context must be meaningfully limited. The existing IRS multi-factor
test is difficult to apply and may lead to organizations that do not
appear to be a church under most definitions being recognized as
such for federal tax purposes. 379 Indeed, commentators are increasingly concerned that the definition is already being stretched beyond recognition. 380 Some courts are moving toward a test that considers many relevant factors but gives greatest weight to a

377. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 137.
378. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
379. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
380. See, e.g., Lidiya Mishchenko, In Defense of Churches: Can the IRS Limit Tax Abuse
by "Church" Impostors?, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1361, 1367-81 (2016); Christine Roem-
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congregational approach. 381 Such an approach requires the regular,
in-person gathering of individuals to engage in worship and other
communal religious activities and appears to be better fit for what
constitutionally should be viewed as a church and therefore eligible
for this approach. 382
The congregational approach has acquired acceptance among
courts383 and commentators, 384 perhaps because it is an easily administrable, objective test and is arguably consistent with the text
and history of the Religion Clauses. Narrow definitions, like the
congregational approach, ensure that our proposed application of
Bob Jones University to churches does not encompass a larger category of tax-exempt organizations than is necessary, desirable, or
constitutionally required. But whatever definition is ultimately
adopted, if a categorical definition is adopted at all, it must account
for the basic distinction that the congregational approach captures
well: churches are a subset of religious organizations, which are
themselves a subset of Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations.
To the extent that a narrow, court-made definition of church
would exclude some entities that would otherwise qualify as a

hildt Moore, Comment, Religious Tax Exemption and the "Charitable Scrutiny" Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 307 (2003); Sarah Pullman Bailey, Major evangelical nonprofits are
trying a new strategy with the IRS that allows them to hide their salaries, WASH. POST, Jan.
17, 2020.
381. See cases cited infra note 383.
382. Transitory crises that make in-person services impossible-like pandemicswould not undermine an institution's legal status as a church, so long as it intends to
resume in-person gatherings as soon as the transitory crisis ends. See Zachary B. Pohlman, "Churches" in a Time of Coronavirus, CANOPY FORUM (Oct. 2, 2020), https://canopyforum.org/2020/10/02/churches-in-a-time-of-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/S6J2KKTC].

383. See, e.g., Found. of Hum. Understanding v. United States, 614 F.3d 1383, 1391
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Church of Eternal Life & Liberty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 916, 924
(1986); Church of Visible Intelligence That Governs the Universe v. United States, 4 Cl.
Ct. 55, 65 (1983).
384. See, e.g., Mirkay, supra note 106, at 740; Jacob E. Dean, "Do You Have That New
Church App for Your iPhone?": Making the Case for A Clearer and Broader Definition of
Church Under the Internal Revenue Code, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 173, 202 (2013); Wendy
Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 345, 351-52
(1990).
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church under the IRS multi-factor test, there is no legal inconsistency. Churches, under the Bob Jones University framework, are a
constitutional class, not a statutory or regulatory carve out. The IRS
is, of course, free to exceed the constitutional floor in affording tax
benefits to more groups than the Constitution requires. The IRS
could not, however, exclude groups that would otherwise qualify
as a church under a constitutional definition.
V.

REVISITING CHURCHES AND BOB JONES UNIVERSITY

There are at least three ways to approach the application of Bob
Jones University to churches today. One way would be to take the
contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine as stated in that
case and assume it applies with equal force to religious organizations of all types, including churches. This is the approach that the
IRS takes385 and was the approach we took in Part IL This approach
led us to identify at least two areas of current conflict-sex discrimination, particularly in employment, and sanctuary churcheswhere the tax benefits enjoyed by a significant number of churches
could be at risk. We also identified at least two areas of likely future
conflict, although opposition to the church practice does not yet rise
to the level of a fundamental public policy, in the case of sexual
orientation discrimination, and the practice appears rare, in the case
of polygamy.
Another approach would be to limit Bob Jones University to its historical and factual context-both the decades-long battle against racial segregation in education and the broader civil rights movement. The question would then become whether any of the current
or likely future conflicts involve a similar confluence of strong political and societal pressures. This approach essentially asks
whether the public policy at issue in Bob Jones University is distinguishable from the ones identified in Part II even if some or all of
the latter might be considered fundamental. For the reasons detailed previously, we reject this approach. 386
385. See supra note 39.
386. See supra Part II.A.
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A third approach would be to consider not whether the fundamental public policies identified are distinguishable from the policy at issue in Bob Jones University, but instead whether the institutions being discussed here-churches-are distinguishable from
the institutions involved in that case. For the reasons discussed
above, our conclusion is that this is the best approach for deciding
how, if at all, Bob Jones University should apply to churches, subject
to certain limitations detailed in this Part.
A.

Current Significant Conflicts
1.

Sex Discrimination

With respect to sex discrimination, whether in employment,
membership, provision of goods or services related to religious activity, or teachings, any attempt by the government to remove tax
benefits from a church for such behavior would significantly interfere with internal church decisions and affairs (assuming the discrimination is based on religious doctrine) because it would almost
certainly closely relate to the faith and mission of the church. The
contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine should therefore
not extend to this situation due to the religious liberty protections
provided by the First Amendment, subject to the limits discussed
further below.
2.
Protecting and Serving Undocumented Immigrants
Unlike sex discrimination, which occurs only within the "sphere"
of the church, sanctuary churches present a more complicated situation. The sphere of authority inherent to churches collides with the
government's sphere of authority, both theoretically and physically, when churches harbor undocumented immigrants who
would otherwise be deported. Setting aside whether churches who
provide sanctuary act illegally, 387 the question becomes whether the

387. And at least one commentator has argued that such church action likely would
not be illegal today. See Scott-Railton, supra note 116, at 417-19.
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IRS can revoke the tax benefits of churches for opposing the fundamental public policy of not interfering with legal deportations
when churches provide sanctuary.
On the one hand, nothing is more private-and hence, more removed from potential state interference-than how a church conducts itself within its own four walls. If the sphere metaphor is to
have any practical implications, it must at least mean that the state
cannot physically intrude upon the sanctuary absent extraordinarily compelling reasons for doing so (such as to prevent criminal activity). On the other hand, part of the "good" that churches offer to
society is fostering respect for authority and promoting democratic
principles. 388 Openly defying immigration law seems to· cut against
this justification for the special treatment of churches within society.
Consider the church whose religious doctrine necessitates safeguarding the undocumented immigrant. 389 That church is faced
with a mutually exclusive choice: obey Caesar or obey God. That is,
comply with secular law (and fundamental public policy) but violate religious law by releasing the immigrant to law enforcement,
thereby retaining secular tax benefits, or comply with religious law
by harboring the immigrant, thereby forfeiting secular tax benefits.
Were a church to face such an ultimatum, its freedom of religious
expression would be seriously threatened. In fact, the sanctuary
church situation presents a quintessential example of the respective
388. See supra notes 359-363 and accompanying text.
389. See Jonathan Zasloff, Sanctuary, Civil Disobedience, and Jewish Law l (UCLA Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper no. 19-33, 2019), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3460605 [https://perma.cc/WU3N-S7MX] Oewish law requires
synagogues to shelter asylum-seekers from immigration authorities under certain circumstances); U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, AD Hoc COMMITIEE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, OUR FIRST, MOST CHERISHED LIBERTY: A STATEMENT ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 3 (2012) (challenging state laws prohibiting the "harboring" of undocumented
immigrants
as
conflicting
with
certain
religious
obligations),
https://www.usccb.org/committees/religious-liberty/our-first-most-cherished-liberty
[https://perma.cc/6RVH-Z74D]; Daniel Burke, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America just became the country's first "sanctuary church body," CNN (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/08/us/lutheran-sanctuary-church/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6C77-88V4].
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authority that church and state have over their own populations. In
this case, the coercive power of the state must yield to the soft sovereignty inherent to the church when its members practice their religion.
This outcome is bolstered in light of the sanctuary concept being
historically and theologically tied into the concept of the church itself as a place of not only spiritual but physical shelter for those
seeking safety. 390 One aspect of the modem sanctuary movement is
that churches provide their protection only to those willing to remain physically within the confines of an existing church building.391 It is this physical limitation that ultimately tips the scale in
favor of churches. For undocumented immigrants, it sharply limits
their freedom and activities, and for churches, it demonstrates the
integration of the sanctuary concept with the existing church's faith
and mission.
B.

Likely Future Significant Conflicts

Part II also identified two issues that, while not currently governed by fundamental public policy, are likely to produce conflicts
in the future-namely, sexual orientation discrimination and polygamy. The social, political, and legal trajectory of the first issue is
such that opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation may very well become a fundamental public policy. As for
the second issue, it is possible that a greater number of churches
that support polygamy may seek tax-exempt status and so create a
conflict with the IRS, which has already indicated it considers opposition to polygamy to be a fundamental public policy. Should either of these developments occur, and should the IRS invoke Bob
Jones University to repeal the tax benefits of a church that acts contrary to said fundamental public policy, the framework we offer
above provides a way for courts to uphold the important religious
390. See Rhonda Shapiro-Rieser, The Sanctuary Movement: A Brief History, CTR. FOR
RELIGIOUS AND SPIRITUAL LIFE (Mar. l, 2017), https://sophia.smith.edu/religious-spiritual-life/2017/03/01/sanctuary-movement-history/ [https://perma.cc/JF24-KED8).
391. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as Trump-Era Immigrant Sanctuaries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2016.
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interests at stake, while it also draws certain bright-line rules on just
how far both churches and the state can encroach into the sphere of
the other.
1.

Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Solicitor General Verrilli's admission392 merely confirmed what
appeared to be true: religious organizations that discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation are potentially susceptible to a Bob
Jones University challenge in light of Obergefell. And if the federal
government comes to consistently oppose sexual-orientation-based
discrimination such that it becomes fundamental public policy, 393
how ought the IRS or reviewing courts determine whether to strip
churches of their tax benefits for violating such policy? Churches
could discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in essentially
two ways. They could (1) refuse to perform same-sex weddings or
provide other religious services to persons with a certain sexual orientation; or (2) disallow those who have a certain sexual orientation
or who engage in certain prohibited sexual conduct from assuming
positions of church authority or to be members at all. While certainly related, the two instances of disparate treatment are distinct
and must be analyzed separately given a contrary-to-fundamentalpublic-policy challenge.
First, some churches, pursuant to their religious doctrine, do not
perform same-sex weddings. Applying the above framework, we

392. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
393. The federal government is not yet uniform in opposing discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. For example, while the Supreme Court recently held that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in
employment, the executive branch opposed this result and members of Congress were
split in their views. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance in No. 17-1618 and Reversal in
No. 17-1623, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618 et al. (U.S. Aug. 23, 2019); Brief of
Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Employers, Bostock v. Clayton Cty.,
No. 17-1618 et al. (U.S. Aug. 23, 2019) (eight Senators and forty Representatives); Brief
Of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618 et al. (U.S. July 3, 2019) (thirty-nine Senators and 114 Representatives).
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must consider whether performing weddings is an essentially internal practice of a church. That is, when a church performs a wedding, is that an intrinsically religious activity, or are weddings outside the scope of a church's fundamentally religious beliefs and
practices? The question answers itself. Whether a church holds religious views regarding marriage can be defined only by the church
itself. Where a church holds to specific religious teachings regarding marriage, the state cannot use its coercive power of taxation to
encourage or pressure a church into violating its sincerely held religious beliefs. As the Supreme Court stated in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
"When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of
the clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious
grounds could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without
denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion." 394 While
churches are not immune from all government interference under
this approach, 395 one obvious implication of the soft sovereignty
justification is that a church must retain the autonomy to decide
which religious ceremonies it conducts and how those ceremonies
are conducted, weddings included. If a church is unwilling to perform same-sex marriages, no act of the state-be it through revocation of tax benefits or otherwise-can compel a church to do so.
Such a coercive act would cause unnecessary entanglement by the
state in the internal affairs of churches by directly influencing their
liturgical practices and would potentially raise serious First
Amendment problems regarding a church's right to free exercise of
religion.
The state's potential interference with liturgy in the marriage context is different than banning the use of peyote in religious ceremonies at issue in Employment Division v. Smith. 396 Smith involved illegal drug use. 397 Refusing to perform same-sex marriages is not
illegal but is rather contrary only to (potential) fundamental public
policy. Moreover, in Smith, the religious observers were prohibited
394. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
395. See infra Part V.C.
396. 494 U.S. 872 (1989).
397. Id. at 874.
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from using peyote, but churches opposing same-sex marriage
would be compelled to perform an act contrary to a sincerely held
belief. When it comes to distinguishing inaction from action, requiring the latter by law implicates a much greater liberty interest. Additionally, Hosanna-Tabor confirms that "Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. [Discrimination in
hiring ministers], in contrast, concerns government interference
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission
of the church itself." 398 Surely weddings, which are liturgical acts
that affect the faith and mission of a church, should be afforded this
same protection. Thus, while the soft sovereignty approach necessitates this result, current legal doctrine likewise supports this outcome.
Moreover, Obergefell itself, which at least implicitly predicted that
same-sex marriage would become widely accepted, 399 recognized
that:
[R]eligions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines,
may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction
that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be
condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious
organizations and persons are given proper protection as
they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and
so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep
aspirations to continue the family structure they have
long revered. 400

Justice Kennedy envisioned that people on both sides of the samesex marriage discussion would continue to "engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate." 401 He concluded the section on religion by noting that, while churches have

398. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190
(2012).
399. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 676 (2015) (noting the numerous legislative
debates, referenda, and scholarly arguments that same-sex marriage should be recognized by the state).
400. Id. at 679-80.
401. Id. at 680.
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the right to disagree with same-sex marriage, "[t]he Constitution ... does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage."402 Obergefell thus does not require churches to perform samesex marriages. If anything, it makes explicit the assumption that a
church cannot legally be compelled to perform any marriages that
are contrary to its sincerely held beliefs. 403 Since Obergefell is arguably the case-or more broadly, the moment-that will have ushered in the acceptance of same-sex marriage as fundamental public
policy, 404 looking to Obergefell for extra guidance on churches' obligations under that policy makes sense. If the IRS does so, in accordance with the framework offered above, it must afford churches the
autonomy not to perform same-sex marriages without the potential
of forfeiting otherwise available tax benefits.
Second, some churches do not allow those who engage in samesex conduct or, less commonly, who have a same-sex orientation to
obtain leadership positions within the church or possibly to be
members or receive goods or services. 405 Assuming again that fundamental public policy would someday be opposed to such discrimination, ought churches that disallow those who engage in
same-sex conduct or who have specified sexual orientations from
obtaining leadership roles, being members, or receiving goods and
services have to forfeit their tax benefits under a Bob Jones University-based challenge? Again, the answer must be "no." In light of
the soft sovereignty approach to church autonomy, churches
should have complete authority over their internal hiring, membership, and goods and services provision practices-assuming al-

402. Id. (emphasis added)
403. See id.
404. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (applying Obergefell to strike a state
rule that did not allow both same-sex spouses to be listed as parents on their child's
birth certificate).
405. See Julia Zauzmer & Sarah Pulliam Bailey, United Methodist Church votes to maintain its apposition to same-sex marriage, gay clergy, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/02/26/united-methodist-churchvotes-maintain-its-opposition-same-sex-marriage-gay-clergy/ [https://perma.cc/Y97UJNY8]; supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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ways that any discrimination is founded upon sincerely held religious beliefs. The First Amendment must allow churches to make
these decisions without fear of retaliatory government action in the
form of de facto taxation. Anything other than complete autonomy
over these core church decisions would invite unnecessary and potentially unlawful entanglement by the state. 406
2.

Polygamy

Applying the above approach in the polygamy context renders a
similar analysis but with notable distinctions. Unlike with same-sex
marriage, in which the (assumed) fundamental public policy is in
favor of same-sex marriage, the (IRS-assumed) fundamental public
policy with regard to polygamy is strict opposition. This inverts the
complications that arise in the same-sex marriage context. For one,
instead of compelling churches to perform same-sex marriages by
threatening revocation of tax benefits, the state, on the same threatened tax benefit revocation grounds, would prohibit a church from
performing polygamous marriages. But do these distinctions make
a difference? It is hard to find a principled reason that they should.
For churches that oppose same-sex marriage as a matter of religious doctrine, that doctrine is informed by views about human
sexuality and what constitutes "marriage." 407 Both prongs that form
the basis of such doctrine are based on "religious" assumptions. For
churches that endorse polygamy, the basis of that belief rests on
different doctrinal assumptions than those that oppose the practice,
but churches that support polygamy nonetheless approach questions of sexuality and marriage in a religious manner. 408 Since defining what constitutes "marriage" is religious, at least when defined by a church, the state has no authority to distinguish among
406. But see infra Part V.C. (limitations).
407. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 'l[ 1601 (2016) ("The matrimonial
covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of
the whole of life, is by its nature ordered toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring .... ").
408. See, e.g., Plural Marriage and Families in Early Utah, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/topics/plural-marriageand-families-in-early-utah?lang--eng [https://perma.cc/SCZ9-UYRN].
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and favor churches whose definitions of marriage comport with the
state's preferred definition. Doing so would have the state exceed
its sphere of authority by encroaching upon churches' sovereign
spheres. Moreover, if the state could do so, then churches that oppose same-sex marriage would have no argument for retaining
their autonomy, given their refusal to perform same-sex weddings.
The state could simply reject the autonomy of such churches, compel compliance with the fundamental public policy, which is in favor of same-sex marriage, and force such churches to either lose
their tax benefits or perform same-sex marriages. Assuming, then,
that a church holds a sincere religious belief that endorses the practice of polygamy, the state-pursuant to the principle of noninterference and in respecting church autonomy-cannot interfere with
that practice by revoking such a church's tax benefits.
But the state's noninterference need not extend so far as to endorse polygamy itself. In other words, just as the state cannot coerce
a church into halting the performance of polygamous marriages,
neither can a church that supports polygamy coerce the state into
endorsing polygamous marriages. Thus, while the state cannot stop
a church from performing a polygamous marriage, it does not have
to legally recognize such marriages. 409 The state need not contradict
its own fundamental public policy-which (assuming arguendo) defines marriage as a union between two, and only two, consenting
adults-by endorsing polygamous unions. Each institution is only
sovereign, and thus autonomous, within its own sphere. That applies equally to churches as well to the state. In light of the view
advanced in this Article, the state could not prohibit a church from
performing a polygamous marriage within a religious context, but
the state would not have to validate that union and act contrary to
fundamental public policy by issuing marriage licenses that endorse polygamy. And if the practices of the church led to violation
409. But see Renuka Santhanagopalan, Note, Menage ii What? The Fundamental Right
to Plural Marriage, 24 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 415, 421-35 (2018)
(arguing that the fundamental right to marry recognized in Obergefell constitutionally
extends to polygamous marriages); Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The
Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 2044 (2015) (same).
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of state criminal statutes prohibiting bigamy, as the IRS found was
the case with a church that promoted polygamy,410 then denial of
tax-exempt status would be justified for the reasons detailed in the
next Part.
C.

Limitations

This approach has several limitations. First, as mentioned earlier
it should only apply to the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy
doctrine and not the related but distinct illegality doctrine, because
in our current legal system churches and their leaders are not fully
separate and equal sovereigns who are above the law (or more accurately, not subject to the government's laws). Rather, the soft sovereignty approach, while recognizing church autonomy, is cognizant of the fact that churches are one of many societal spheres-the
state as sphere of spheres chief among them. If churches were above
the law, we would be in a world where the hard sovereignty approach to the application of tax and other laws to churches was still
in place. The protections of the First Amendment do not go that far.
Therefore, if a church is found by the appropriate authority to
have engaged in illegal behavior as a significant part of its activities,
including with respect to sex discrimination or immigration laws,
that would justify the loss of the tax benefits that churches otherwise enjoy. An extreme example of such a situation would be a
church that engages in human sacrifice-that is, murder-but more
realistic examples also exist, such as the church that was found to
have engaged in the distribution of marijuana. 411 Of course, in this
situation the church and its leaders likely will be more concerned
about the direct sanctions associated with that illegal behavior than
the indirect tax consequences, as noted previously.
Second, and relatedly, there is the issue of whether the illegal behavior should be limited to criminal illegality or also extend to violations of civil laws. Given the breadth of civil laws at both the federal and state levels and the triviality of the activities they penalize
410. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
411. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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in many instances, we believe only criminal activities should be
able to form the basis for revocation of tax-exempt status for a
church under the Bob Jones University decision. This appears to be
the approach the IRS has usually taken, including with respect to
applying the illegality doctrine to churches. 412
Finally, for the reasons stated previously, this Article has accepted Bob Jones University as a given, and so has not questioned the
Court's holding in the case that the First Amendment does not
shield non-church religious organizations from the contrary-tofundamental-public-policy doctrine. In addition, we have noted
that when non-church religious organizations provided secular services or goods in a manner that is contrary to fundamental public
policy, the government has a stronger interest in denying them tax
benefits than it does in the case of a typical church, although some
commentators would reject this distinction. 413 Accepting this limitation, if a church is engaged in secular education, health care, or
similar activities the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine would still apply. The previously discussed IRS decision to
revoke the tax-exempt status of a legal entity that housed both a
traditional church and a racially discriminatory school was therefore correct, especially since the church could avoid the loss of tax
benefits by moving the school into a separate (taxable) legal entity.414
CONCLUSION

While rarely invoked, Bob Jones University remains good law and
so provides a potential basis for revoking the tax benefits normally
412. See supra Part LB.
413. See supra note 367 and accompanying text (supporting this distinction); Robert
M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 66 (1983) (rejecting this
distinction).
414. Indeed, this is the strategy that Bob Jones University used to obtain tax-exempt
status under Section 501(c)(3) for its art museum. See Bob Jones Univ. Museum & Art
Gallery v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3120 (1996); Victoria B. Bjorklund, Spinoffs: Bob

Jones University Museum and Beyond: Evolving Techniques for Use of For-Profit Subsidiaries,
Asset Protection, and Other Multiple-Entity Structures, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Dec.
5, 1996.
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enjoyed by certain nonprofit organizations, as highlighted by the
exchange during the Obergefell oral argument. Moreover, there are
both current and foreseeable conflicts between the activities of
some churches and likely fundamental public policies. Yet while
the IRS has indicated it views the decision as fully applying to
churches, the Supreme Court has never so held. Based on
longstanding philosophical views of how churches and the state
should interact and a more recent theory regarding how the First
Amendment should govern such interactions, we conclude that Bob
Jones University should not apply with full force to churches. Instead, it should apply only if a church violates the illegality doctrine
by engaging in significant criminal activities. But if instead a
church's activities are only contrary to fundamental public policy,
then the state should recognize a church's autonomy or soft sovereignty by providing the church with the tax benefits to which it is
entitled.

